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THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT 
AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE IN THE 
1990'S: MAKING THE CASE FOR 
FEDERAL LAND USE TO 
PRESERVE COASTAL AREAS 
LINDA A. MALONE* 
In 1972, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA). The passage of the CZMA created a great sense of achieve-
ment in many different quarters because for the first time Congress 
had declared a national interest in land use decisions previously 
viewed as local in nature. The CZMA acknowledged that a rapidly 
growing population endangered the fragility and beauty of the coastal 
zone. 1 Throughout its history, however, the strength of the CZMA 
has been threatened by inadequate funding and eroded by court deci-
sions. As a result, the very existence of the CZMA, perhaps the most 
comprehensive effort to combine state and federal land use planning, 
was often threatened. 2 
The progression of coastal zone management law from 1972 until 
its most recent amendments in 1990 presents in stark relief the issues 
crucial to effective environmental preservation which have been 
avoided studiously by Congress, the courts, and the states during the 
brief history of the environmental movement. Is preservation of frag-
ile resources possible without substantive land use restrictions imposed 
at the federal level? How is the balance of responsibility for the envi-
ronment to be struck between the federal and state governments? 
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
I. Coastal Zone Management: Hearing before the Nat'/ Ocean Pol'y Study of the Comm on Com-
merce, Science, and Transport. of the Senate, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. I (1987) [hereinafter cited as 
"Hearing'']. 
2. Id at 2. 
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When environmental values conflict with private property rights, 
which should prevail and how should that policy determination be in-
corporated into modem jurisprudence under the takings clause? 
When environmental preservation only can occur at the expense of 
other publicly held values, such as the need for cheap energy, what 
mechanisms can reconcile or balance the competing interests? 
This article will utilize coastal zone management as a backdrop to 
these issues. It will also attempt to demonstrate that avoidance of 
these issues is at least partially responsible for the current state of cri-
sis in coastal land and water resources. Such avoidance is responsible, 
in a broader sense, for the limited effectiveness of twenty years of envi-
ronmental regulation. After a comprehensive review of current law 
regulating the coastal zone, including the CZMA and recent cases in-
terpreting the CZMA, this article will focus on how these cases and 
other practical problems in administration of the CZMA have dimin-
ished the effectiveness of the Act. Many of these cases have involved 
conflicts between offshore leasing and state coastal protection and the 
extent to which a state can restrict private property interests without 
running afoul of the constitutional prohibition on taking of private 
property without just compensation. In conclusion this article evalu-
ates coastal protection in the context of the broad and difficult issues 
of environmental policy still awaiting resolution. 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL COASTAL LAND USE 
The United States' coastal zone is rich in resources valued for 
transportation, food, water, dilution of waste, and aesthetics. 3 The 
coastal zone acts as a buffer for dispersion of pollutants and sediments. 
The coasts offer attractive areas for homes and recreation and are 
often the site of major ports and industry.4 Approximately 70% of the 
total United States commercial fisheries catch consists of species that 
are dependent upon estuarine environments in their life cycle, and an 
even greater percentage of the recreational catch is dependent on 
estuaries. s 
These resource values of the coastal zone depend upon preserva-
tion of the various coastal zones' natural character. Yet nearly fifty-
three percent of the United States' population lives in counties within 
50 miles of the coastline or the Great Lakes. 6 It was predicted that by 
3. /d. at 38. 
4. /d. at 73. 
S. /d. at 45. 
6. NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE 
FEDERAL COASTAL PROGRAMS REVIEW, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1981). 
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1990 this percentage will climb to 75%.7 In addition, the United 
States has jurisdiction and control over 1.8 million square miles of 
continental shelf and slope under which enormous amounts of energy 
resources exist. 8 It has been estimated that at least 3.5 billion cubic 
feet of gas reserves are offshore. 9 Development in the coastal zone 
could, however, result in toxic contamination, eutrophication, con-
tamination by human pathogens, loss and alteration of habitats critical 
to living resources, and alterations to circulation and freshwater in-
ftow.10 In addition, the so-called "greenhouse effect," a steady in-
crease in carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, threatens a rise in 
global sea level of one to three feet in the next 70 years from the ac-
companying global climate warming. 11 As a result, the quality of the 
coastal environment is on the decline, 12 while the CZMA, the primary 
source of environmental coastal protection, continues to be in 
jeopardy. 
In the Environmental Protection Agency's Near Coastal Water 
Strategic Options Paper published in 1986, the EPA states: 
Near coastal waters are becoming more and more degraded 
despite existing federal, state and local laws and regulations gov-
erning coastal and ocean pollution and land and water uses. The 
environmental quality of near coastal waters will continue to de-
cline unless changes are made in the way land and water uses af-
fecting them are managed. 13 
It was precisely these concerns that triggered passage of the CZMA in 
1972.14 In 1966 the Commission of Marine Science, Engineering and 
Resources, 15 known as the Stratton Commission, released a study on 
the conflict between development of coastal resources and coastal 
preservation. In its final report, 16 the Commission concluded that 
7. Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 159 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4376, 4380. 
8. Grosso, Federal Offshore Leasing: States' Concerns Fall on Deaf Ears, 2 FLA. ST. J. OF LAND 
UsE & ENVTL. L. 249, 250 (1986). 
9. /d. 
to. Hearing, supra note I, at 46-47. 
I I. /d. at 47. 
12. /d. at 46. 
13. /d. 
14. See generally Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 7 
URB. L. ANN. 119 (1974). 
IS. Created by Pub. L. No. 89-454 (1966). 
16. U.S. COMM'N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND 
THE SEA, A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 56-57 (1969); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL 
ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976 WITH A SECTION BY SECTION 
INDEX 2 (Comm. Print 1976). 
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states were in the best position to manage coastal resources but that 
federal funds should be provided to help states bear the expenses of 
administration. These recommendations were essentially incorporated 
into the regulation of land and water uses in the CZMA. 
Inadequate -and sometimes nonexistent funding,l1 case by case 
decisionmaking, state/federal conflicts, uncoordinated planning, pres-
sure for development and energy, insufficient research information, 
splintered federal authority, and restrictive court decisions are a few of 
the problems that have plagued the CZMA. States have indicated that 
they are unable to assume the financial burdens of adnllnistering their 
management plans without federal funds. Only a few of the twenty-
nine states with coastal zone management programs are willing to con-
tinue their present programs without federal assistance. 18 Absent fed-
eral funding, the only remaining incentive for coastal states to 
continue their programs, until Congress intervened in 1990, was the 
requirement that federal actions be consistent with state programs. 19 
This incentive· had been significantly undermined by the Supreme 
Court. 20 At the same time, the Reagan administration significantly 
expanded the number and size of federal lease sales for Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OCS) energy development.21 With the recent amend-
ments to the CZMA in 1990,22 the next few years will be a crucial test 
for continuance of coastal zone management. 
II. COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT LAW 
The purpose of the CZMA is to preserve the unique values of 
coastal lands and waters by encouraging states to devise land and 
water use plans for coastal protection. 23 The Act provides funds to 
states that develop programs for management of land and water uses 
consistent with the Act's standards. The Secretary of Commerce must 
17. In 1987, for example, the Senate Appropriation Committee cut the coastal zone management 
budget from $40 million to S5 million. Hearing, supra note I, at 44. 
18. The only states that have indicated they would continue their current programs without finan-
cial assistance are California, Louisiana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. E. Kaplan & 
A. Ritachard, Lessening the Scope of Federal Coastal Zone Management: What's at Stake? I, 21 (June 
1982) (Unpublished paper available at Department of Energy and Environment, Brookhaven National 
Laboratory). 
19. See infra notes 137-147 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra note 199. 
21. Grosso, supra note 8, at 275. 
22. Hearing, supra note I, at 3. 
23. Coastal Zone Management Reauthorization Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1988). The 
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980 
( CZMI) are administered by the Secretary of Commerce, that authority having been delegated to the 
Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). See Hearing, supra note I, at 37-38; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(16), 1454(a). 
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approve state programs upon finding that they satisfy the requirements 
of sections 305. and 306 of the CZMA. After approval, the Secretary 
may award grants to the state for the costs of administration of the 
approved state management program. 24 In addition to grants states 
obtain for having an approved program, states also benefit from the 
requirement that federal agencies, permittees, and licensees must show 
that their proposed developments, including certain oil and gas activi-
ties on the outer continental shelf, are consistent with the state's man-
agement program. 25 
A. Definition of the Coastal Zone 
The CZMA defines "coastal zones" as 
the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and 
the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein and thereun-
der), strongly influenced by each other and in proximity to the 
shorelines of the several coastal states, [which] includes islands, 
transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and 
beaches.26 
In 1990 the definition was amended to limit the seaward bound-
ary to the extent of state ownership and title under the Submerged 
Lands Act. 27 The zone now extends inland "to the extent necessary to 
control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant im-
pact on the coastal waters, and to control those geographical areas 
which are likely to be affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise."28 To 
paraphrase, the coastal zone consists ofthe land affected by the waters 
and the waters affected by the land. The definition of the coastal zone 
is purposefully vague, giving states great discretion in setting their 
own jurisdiction. This discretion is necessary because different types 
of areas, developed and undeveloped, may exist within a single state's 
coastal zone. 
Excluded from the definition of coastal zone· is land "the use of 
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in 
trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents."29 In Granite 
Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 30 a mining company sought 
to enjoin the coastal commission from requiring a state permit under 
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455; see infra II(B). 
25. § 1456(c); see infra ll(c). 
26. /d. § 1453(1). 
27. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1301-1356 (1988). 
28. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6204, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
29. /d. 
30. 768 F.2d 1077 (1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 572 (1987). 
716 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
the California Coastal Act, originally passed to implement the CZMA 
in California. The mining, operation at issue was located on an unpat-
ented mining claim on land owned by the federal government in a 
national forest. 31 The district court held that the land on which the 
company was mining did not fall within the federal exclusion from the 
coastal zone. 32 California's permit requirement was upheld on the 
grounds that the states have concurrent authority with the federal gov-
ernment over federal lands in the coastal zone, that the mining claim 
was not exclusively subject to federal jurisdiction, and that there was 
no federal preemption. 33 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding that the state permit requirement was preempted. The 
court found that the Forest Service regulations governing mining in 
the national forests preempted the permit requirement. 34 According 
to the court, the CZMA was not intended by Congress to change the 
status quo for allocation of federal and state power over lands within 
the coastal zone. 35 The court relied on the First Iowa 36 doctrine that 
federal law establishing a federal permit system for an activity 
preempts state law prohibiting the activity without a state permit, but 
only if the state permit requirements "intrude into the sphere of fed-
eral permit authority."37 In finding preemption, the court stated that 
the Forest Service regulations mandated that the power to prohibit 
mining for failure to abide by environmental requirements was to re-
side in the Forest Service, not the state. 38 
The Supreme Court reversed in the Court's only decision to date 
strengthening the impact of the CZMA.39 According to Justice 
O'Connor's opinion, 40 the test for preemption is the same as that used 
by the Court in other cases in which the Property Clause41 was not 
implicated: state law is preempted ( 1) if Congress has evidenced intent 
31. 768 F.2d at 1079. 
32. /d. It had also been held in another case that the federal land exclusion does not extend to 
effects on the surrounding non-federal coastal zone that may be caused by federal activities conducted 
on federal lands. Puerto Rico v. Musk.ie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D. P.R. 1981), vacated, Marquez-Colon v. 
Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981). 
33. 768 F.2d at 1079. 
34. /d. at 1083. 
35. /d. at 1081. 
36. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). 
37. 768 F.2d at 1082. 
38. /d. at 1083. For further background on mining activity on federal lands, see Burling, Local 
Control of Mining Activities on Federal Lands, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 ( 1986). 
39. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987). 
40. O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun. 480 U.S. at 574. 
41. "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CoNST., art. IV, § 3, 
cl. 2. 
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to occupy entirely the given field or, (2) where Congress has not dis-
placed state regulation, (a) state law actually conflicts with federal law, 
(b) it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or (c) 
state law frustrates the purposes and objectives of Congress.42 
As a facial challenge to the permit requirement, no particular 
conditions that the California Coastal Commission might impose in 
the permit were at issue.43 According to the Court, the Forest Service 
regulations controlling unpatented mining claims in national forests 
were not only "devoid of any expression of intent to preempt state law, 
but rather appear[ed] to assume that those submitting plans of opera-
tion will comply with state laws."44 Even assuming that the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act45 and National Forest Manage-
ment Act46 preempt the extension of state land use plans to unpat-
ented mining claims in national forests, Congress did not intend to 
preempt "reasonable" state environmental regulation.47 Justice 
O'Connor distinguished land use planning from environmental regula-
tion, stating: "Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses 
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate 
particular uses of land but requires only that, however the land is 
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits."48 
Finally, the federal exclusion from the definition of coastal zone in the 
CZMA 49 did not apply to Granite Rock's unpatented mining claim. 
Relying on the CZMA's non-derogation clause50 and its legislative his-
tory, the Court concluded "that even if all federal lands are excluded 
from the CZMA definition of 'coastal zone,' the CZMA does not auto-
matically preempt all state regulation of activities on federallands."51 
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, 
42. 480 U.S. at 582. 
43. ld. at 580-581. 
44. ld. at 583. 
45. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1701-1784 (1988). 
46. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1600- 1614 (1988). 
47. 480 U.S. at 588-589. 
48. /d. at 587. 
49. 16 u.s.c. § 1453(1) (1985). 
SO. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed-
( I) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights in the field 
of planning, development, or control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable 
waters; nor to displace, supersede, limit or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction 
or responsibility of any legally established joint or common agency of two or more states or 
of two or more states and the Federal Government; nor to limit the authority of Congress 
to authorize and fund projects .... 
16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(l) (1988). 
5 l. 480 U.S. at 594. A consistency certification could not be required because the mining claim 
was an unlisted activity for which 30 days notice from California of intent to review had not been given. 
/d. at 593. · 
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concurring in part and dissenting in part. 52 Justice Powell agreed with 
the majority on the procedural issues raised prior to consideration of 
the merits, but disagreed with the majority's distinction between land 
use and environmental regulation. 53 Failing to see a difference be-
tween environmental regulation and land use, Justice Powell con-
cluded that Congress had entrusted the balancing of mineral 
development· and environmental protection in the national forests to 
the Forest Service under the National Forest Management Act and 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 54 He also criticized the 
majority for giving so little weight to the location of the mine in a 
national forest and the comprehensiveness of the federal statutes au-
thorizing the mining permit, ss but expressed no view as to the Court's 
interpretation of the CZMA as not preempting state regulation in the 
case. 56 
Justice Scalia and Justice White dissented on the merits, contend-
ing that the case should have been decided on narrower and simpler 
grounds than those advanced by the majority. 57 Viewing California's 
permit requirement as a land use, not environmental, control, these 
Justices contended that preemption applied because state land use reg-
ulation of federal land is preempted by federal law.58 Justice Scalia 
referred to the California Coastal Act59 and concluded that the Cali-
fornia Coastal Act and the CZMA are primarily land use regula-
tions. 60 Even assuming that California would use the permit 
requirement to enforce environmental laws, California could not do so 
unless it. had land use authority over the federal land in question.61 
California did not have land use authority over the mining claim in a 
national forest, according to Justice Scalia, because Congress intended 
for federal officials to have exclusive authority under NFMA and 
FLPMA, as well as the CZMA.62 Although Justice Scalia agreed with 
the majority that the CZMA did not change the status quo with re-
gard to state authority over federal lands, he determined that the fed-
52. 480 U.S. at 594 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
53. /d. at 594 (Powell, J., con9urring and dissenting). 
54. Jd. at 602-603 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
55. /d. at 605 n.6 (Powell, J .•. concurring and dissenting). 
S6. Jd. 
57. /d. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58. /d. 
59. Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. 30,000 et seq. (West 1986). 
60. 480 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61. Justice Scalia believed that the evidence showed that California did have land use interests in 
addition to environmental concerns. /d. at 612-613 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 612-613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters point out that the argument that the 
land is not excluded from the CZMA was not "pressed" before the Court, and was rejected by both the 
lower courts. /d. (Scalia, 1 ., dissenting). 
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eral lands exclusion and consistency review provisions demonstrate 
that the status quo was exclusive federal authority.63 
The importance of Granite Rock goes beyond the limited context 
of mining claims on federal land in the coastal zone. The Court's reli-
ance on the non-derogation clause in the CZMA may have broad im-
plications for federal preemption of state coastal regulation. However, 
the case does little to clarify the precise scope of state authority over 
federal land in the coastal zone or to clarify whether state power under 
the CZMA for private activity on federal land is limited to consistency 
review. Also, the Court failed to decide whether federal land was ex-
cluded from the coastal zone under section 304(a). In a more general 
context, one of the most important questions after Granite Rock is 
whether the state can enforce its permit requirement through injunc-
tive relief. It would seem from the opinion that so long as the state's 
regulation is environmental, the state could seek injunctive relief to 
enforce the permit requirement. Thus, the most common issue as to 
state authority after Granite Rock will be whether state coastal regula-
tion is environmental or land use regulation. 
The Court avoided the issue of whether a state could deny a per-
mit or condition a permit on compliance, insofar as the case only in-
volved a facial challenge to the permit requirement. The answer may 
depend upon whether the state's requirements are unreasonable or so 
severe as to be a regulatory taking. It' may also be that Granite Rock 
applies only to state permit requirements, not to local or county per-
mit requirements. Outside of the coastal zone context, Granite Rock 
indicates that preemption issues involving federal land are the same as 
in other contexts not involving federal land. Given all the unanswered 
questions after Granite Rock, however, states would be wise to con-
tinue involvement and input in federal land use planning, in addition 
to establishing their own permit systems. 
Because the Court did not have to decide whether federal land is 
excluded from the coastal zone under section 304(a), it also avoided 
the issue of when consistency review is required under section 
307(c)(3)(A) for activities on federal land affecting the state's coastal 
zone. The Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 64 
since modified by the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, 65 in~icated 
that for purposes of section 307(c)(l) consistency review, activities by 
federal agencies on federal land located within the coastal zone must 
63. /d. (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
64. 464 u.s. 312 (1984). 
65. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6208, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-307 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
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be reviewed for consistency if they affect the coastal zone, although 
this difference may be explained by the differing language in sections 
307(c)(3)(A) and 307(c)(l). Nevertheless, in spirit the Court in Gran-
ite Rock seems less than certain about the reach of consistency review 
for activities on federal lands physically situated within a state coastal 
zone. 
B. Overview of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and 
the Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 
1980 
Under the CZMA, coastal states66 are given grants for the devel-
opment and administration of federally approved state management 
programs for coastal zones.67 As of 1989, 29 out of 35 states eligible 
under the CZMA had approved management programs.68 From 1974 
to 1985, 187 million dollars was provided to coastal states in the form 
of grants. 69 The 1990 amendments increased appropriations for the 
CZMA program for the years 1991 to 1995.70 Approval of state pro-
grams is made through the Assistant Administrator of the Office of 
Coastal Zone Management (now known as the Office of Ocean and 
Coastal Resource Management'') and is dependent upon satisfaction 
of four general requirements: (1) the program must provide for man-
agement of land and water uses having a direct and significant impact 
on coastal waters 72 and take steps to assure appropriate protection of 
significant resources and areas, such as wetlands, beaches, dunes, and 
66. "Coastal state" is generally defined as a state in or bordering on the Atlantic, Pacific, or 
Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or any of the Great Lakes, Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. trust territory of the Pacific Islands. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 14S3(4) (1988). 
67. 16 CoASTAL ZoNE MOMT. NEWSL. 4 (Mar. 28, 198S). A management program apparently 
has little or no legal effect until approved. City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F. 
Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977), ajf'd, 61S F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980); Enos v. Marsh, 616 F. Supp. 32 (D. 
Haw. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 198S); see also Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Dev. Corp., 
S62 F. Supp. 188 (D. P.R. 1983). Once the Secretary approves a program, that approval continues 
indefinitely until the next time the Secretary reviews the program. 16 U.S.C. § 14S8 (1988); see also 
Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 122S (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987). 
68. 16 CoASTAL ZoNE MOMT. NEWSL. 4 (Mar. 28, 198S). 
69. Under §§ 30S & 306, development grants for program costs may be made annually to any 
coastal state demonstrating that the funds will be used to develop a final management program in 
accord with 16 U.S.C. § 14SS (1988). Additional grants will only be made to states that "satisfactorily 
develop" their management programs. Coastal states may also be eligible for funding to complete 
management programs which are not yet approved. See infra notes 83-87. 
70. 16 u.s.c. § 1464. 
71. See note 6, supra. 
72. The term "coastal waters" is defined as "(A) in the Great Lakes area, the waters within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States consisting of the Great Lakes, their connecting waters, 
harbors, roadsteads, and estuary-type areas such as bays, shallows, and marshes and (B) in other areas, 
those waters adjacent to the shoreline, which contain a measurable quantity or percentage of sea water, 
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barrier islands, that make the states' coastal zone a unique, vulnerable, 
or valuable area; (2) the program must contain three broad classes of 
policies that are related to resource protection, management of coastal 
development, and simplification of governmental processes; (3) the 
policies must be appropriate to the nature and degree of management 
related to uses, areas, and resources identified as subject to the pro-
gram; and (4) the policies, standards, objectives, criteria, and proce-
dures by which program decisions will be made must provide a clear 
understanding of the content of the program, especially in identifying 
who will be affected by the program and how, as well as a clear sense 
of direction and predictability for decisionmakers who must take ac-
tions pursuant to or consistent with the management program. 73 
Under the second requirement the regulations require, among other 
things, inclusion of policies that provide the framework for various 
management techniques and authorities and policies that address uses 
of or impacts on wetlands and floodplains in accordance with Execu-
tive Order No. 11,990 for wetlands and Executive Order No. 11,988 
for floodplains. 74 
Additionally, every management program must satisfy the follow-
ing substantive requirements: (1) identification of the boundaries of 
the coastal zone subject to the management program; 75 (2) a defini-
tion of what constitutes permissible land and water uses that have a 
direct and significant impact on the coastal waters; 76 (3) an inventory 
and designation of areas of particular concern;77 (4) identification of 
including, but not limited to, sounds, bays, lagoons, bayous, ponds, and estuaries." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(3) 
(1988). 
73. 15 C.F.R. § 923.3(b)(l) - (4) (1990). 
74. ld. § 923.3(b)(2)(i) - (ii). 
75. There are four elements to a state's boundary: "the inland boundary, the seaward boundary, 
areas excluded from the boundary, and in most cases, interstate boundaries." ld. § 923.30(b). The 
inland boundary must include: (1) those areas the management of which is necessary to control uses 
which have direct and significant impacts on coastal waters, designated areas of special concern, waters 
under saline influence, salt marshes and wetlands, beaches, transitional and intertidal areas, and islands. 
The inland boundary must be presented clearly enough to permit determination of whether property or 
an activity is located within the management area. The boundary may be defined in terms of political 
jurisdiction, but states must be able to advise interested parties within 30 days of receipt of an inquiry 
whether they are subject to the management program. ld. § 923.3l(a). Beyond those areas required as 
above, states have the option of including within the coastal zone: watersheds, areas of tidal influence 
that extend further inland than waters under saline influence, and Indian lands not held in trust by the 
federal government. ld. § 923.31(b). 
The regulations clarify seaward boundaries in 15 C.F.R. § 923.32. States must exclude lands 
owned, leased, held in trust, or otherwise used solely by federal agencies. Excluded federal lands do not 
remove from federal agencies the obligation of the consistency provisions of§ 307 when federal actions 
in such lands have impacts that significantly affect coastal zone areas, uses, or resources of the state's 
management program. Jd. § 923.33. 
76. 16 u.s.c. § 1455(d)(2). 
77. Id. 
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the means to exert control over land and water uses, including a listing 
of relevant constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and judicial de-
cisions; (5) broad guidelines or priorities of uses in particular areas 
including specifically those of lowest priority; ( 6) a description of orga-
nizational structure proposed to implement the program, including the 
responsibilities and interrelationships of local, areawide, state, regional 
and interstate agencies in the management process; (7) a definition of 
the term "beach"78 and a planning process for the protection of, and 
access to, public beaches and other public coastal areas of environmen-
tal, recreational, historical, aesthetic, ecological, or cultural value; (8) 
a planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which 
may significantly affect, the coastal zone, including, but not limited to, 
a process for anticipating and managing the impacts from such facili-
ties; 79 and (9) a planning process for assessing the effects of shoreline 
erosion80 and studying and evaluating ways to control, or lessen the 
impact of, such erosion and to restore areas adversely affected by such 
erosion. 81 The regulations require that an environmental impact state-
ment, prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy 
78. The management program must contain a procedure for assessing public beaches and other 
public areas, there must be a definition of the term "beach" thai is the broadest definition allowable 
under state law or constitutional provisions, as well as an identification of public areas meeting that 
definition, and an identification and description of enforceable policies, legal authorities, funding pro-
grams and other techniques that will be used to provide such shorefront access and protection that the 
state's planning process indicates is necessary. 15 C.P.R. § 923.24(c). 
79. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987), deciding the access issue in a taking context, see III, infra. The planning process 
required must include identification of energy facilities which are likely· to locate in, or which may 
"significantly aft'ect" a state's coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(8) (1988). States must consider at a 
minimum those facilities listed in § 304(5) (the definition of coastal energy activity in 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1453(5) (1988)) of the Act, and, at a minimum "significantly affect" shall be defined in terms of 
substantial or potentially substantial changes in coastal zone resources which could be aft'ected by a 
proposed energy facility, including changes in land, air, water, mineral, flora, fauna, noise, and objects 
of historic, cultural, archaeological or aesthetic significance. IS C.P.R.§ 923.13(b)(l) (1990). In addi-
tion, the process must include procedures for assessing the suitability of sites for energy facilities, artic-
ulation and identification of enforceable state policies, authorities and techniqu~ for managing energy 
facilities and their impacts, and identification of how interested and aft'ected public and private parties 
will be involved in the planning process. Jd. § 923~13(b)(2)-(4). 
For further discussion of the requirement of consistency as applicable to siting of energy facilities, 
see Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q. 
533 (1980); see generally Randle, Coastal Energy Dilemmas, 21 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 126 (1981). 
80. Special management of erosion may be achieved either by designating erosion areas as "areas 
of particular concern" pursuant to 15 C.P.R.§ 923.21 (1990), or as areas for "preservation or restora-
tion" pursuant to 15 C.P.R. § 923.22 (1990). ld. § 923.25(b). There must be a method for assessing the 
effects of shoreline erosion and evaluating techniques for mitigating, controlling, or restoring areas 
adversely aft'ected by erosion; and an identification of enforceable policies, legal authorities, funding 
techniques, and other techniques to manage the erosion as indicated to be necessary by the State's 
planning process. ld. § 923.25(c). 
81. 16 u.s.c. § 1455(d)(2) (1988). 
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Act, accompany the state's management program. 82 The regulations 
provide some guidance in defining permissible land and water uses 
that have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters under the 
second requirement listed above. 
The CZMA provides for "management program development 
grants" under section 30583 and "administrative grants" under section 
306.84 Although the statutory language is confusing, grants are made 
under section 305 for a state to develop a final management program. 
When that program is approved by the OCRM, the state is eligible for 
further grants under section 306 to implement and administer the 
program. 
Development grants may be made annually to any coastal state 
that demonstrates that the grant will be used to develop a management 
program satisfying the requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (section 306) 
for approved management programs. 85 Annual grants of up to 
$200,000 are available on a four-to-one, federal-state matching fund 
basis for development of state management programs in fiscal years 
1991, 1992, and 1993. No state may receive more than two grants.86 
After a development grant is first approved for a coastal state, no sub-
sequent grants may be made unless the state is "satisfactorily develop-
ing its management program. "87 
When a management program is completed by the state, ap-
proved by the Secretary of Commerce, and ready for full implementa-
tion, further grants are determined by the provisions of section 1455 
(section 306 of the Act) for administrative grants.88 Grants for admin-
istration may be given to the state if the Secretary finds the substantive 
requirements of section 1455(d)(2) for management programs are met 
and approves the state's management program. 89 Prior to granting 
82. 15 C.P.R. § 923.72(a) (1990). The requirements of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act 
must also be incorporated into the program and are the controlling pollution requirements. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(!) ( 1988). For a helpful case discussion of the interrelationship between coastal regulation and 
NEPA, see Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. 3d· 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 
410 (1990). 
83. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
84. /d. § 1455(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
85. /d. § 1454(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
86. /d. 
87. /d. 
88. /d. § 1455. 
89. /d. § 1455(b). Generally, the costs of administering a program include costs incurred in car-
rying out, in a manner consistent with the Act, projects and other activities that are necessary or 
appropriate to the implementation of the program. 
Under the 1990 amendments, states with approved programs prior to enactment of the amend-
ments are entitled to federal funding on a one-to-one ratio for any fiscal year. /d. § 1455(a)(l). For 
programs approved after enactment, states may receive federal funds on a four-to-one ratio of federal-
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approval, the Secretary must also find that: 
( 1) the management program has been adopted in accordance 
with the applicable regulations after notice and with the op-
portunity of full participation by the relevant federal agen-
cies, 90 state agencies, local governments, regional 
organizations, port authorities, and other public and private 
interested parties;91 
(2) the state has held public hearings in its development;92 
(3) the management program and any changes have been re-
viewed and approved by the Governor;93 
(4) the Governor of the state has designated a single agency to 
receive and administer the administrative grarits;94 
(5) the state is organized to implement the management 
program;95 
(6) the state has the authority necessary to implement the 
program;96 
(7) the management program provides for adequate considera-
tion of the national interest involved in planning for, and in 
the siting of, facilities (including energy facilities in, or which 
significantly affect, such state's coastal zone) that are neces-
sary to meet requirements that are not local in nature;97 and 
to-state contributions for the first fiscal year, 2.3-to-1 for the second year, l.S-to-1 for the third year and 
one-to-one thereafter. /d. § 1455(aX2). 
90. "(R]elevant Federal agencies" are those agencies with "programs, activities, projects, regula-
tory, financing, or other assistance responsibilities in the following fields which could impact or affect a 
State's coastal zone: (i) Energy production or transmission, (ii) Recreation of more than local nature, 
(iii) Transportation, (iv) Production of food and fiber, (v) Preservation of life and property, (vi) Na-
tional defense, (vii) Historic, cultural, aesthetic, and conservation values, (viii) Mineral resources and 
extraction, and (ix) Pollution abatement and control." IS C.P.R. § 923.2(d)(1) (1990). The regulations 
specifically define "relevant Federal agencies" to include the following departments: Agriculture; Com-
merce; Defense; Energy; Health; Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; Interior; 
Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; 
the General Services Administration; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /d. § 923.2(d)(2). 
"Relevant Federal agencies" and "Federal agencies" principally affected are given the same meaning 
under the regulations. /d. § 923.2(e). 
91. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14SS(d)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
92. /d. § 1455(d)(4). 
93. Id. § 1455(dXS). 
94. /d. § 1455(d)(6). 
95. /d. § 1455(d)(7). 
96. /d. § 145S(d)(IO). Authority for the management of the coastal zone in accordance with the 
management program includes the power to: (I) administer land and water use regulations, control 
development to ensure compliance with the management program, and resolve conflicts among compet· 
ing uses; and (2) acquire fee simple and less than fee simple interests in lands, waters, and other prop-
erty through condemnation or other means when necessary to achieve conformance with the 
management program. /d. 
97. /d. § 145S(d)(8). Where energy facilities are necessary to meet requirements that are not 
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(8) the management program makes provision for procedures 
whereby specific areas may be designated for the purpose of 
preserving or restoring them for their conservation, recrea-
tional, ecological, or aesthetic values. 98 
One troublesome aspect of these requirements is that the state must 
designate an agency to receive federal funds and an agency with the 
authority to implement the state program, but there is no indication 
that these two agencies need be the same agency. 
In addition, for approval of a management program the state 
must have coordinated the program with local, area-wide, and inter-
state plans applicable to areas within the coastal zone existing on Jan-
uary 1 of the year in which the management program is submitted to 
the Secretary. 99 The state also must establish an "effective mecha-
nism" for continuing consultation and coordination between the desig-
nated management agency and local governments, interstate agencies, 
regional agencies, and area-wide agencies within the coastal zone to 
assure the full participation of such governments and agencies. 100 
A mechanism for consultation shall not be considered "effective" 
unless three additional requirements will be met. First, the manage-
ment agency for the state program is required "before implementing 
any management program decision which would conflict with any lo-
cal zoning ordinance, decision, or other action, [to] send a notice of 
such management program decision to any local government whose 
zoning authority is affected" thereby. 101 Second, the notice must pro-
vide that such local government may, "within the thirty-day period 
commencing on the date of receipt of such notice, . . . submit to the 
management agency written comments on the management program 
decision, and any recommendation or alternatives," unless such local 
purely local, the Secretary must find that the state has given such consideration to any applicable 
interstate energy plan or program. /d. 
98. /d. § 1455(d)(9). 
99. /d. § 1455(d)(3)(A)(i). 
100. /d. § 1455(d)(3)(b). In Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D. P.R. 1979), modified sub 
nom. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981), Puerto Rico 
sought to enjoin the United States Navy from carrying out naval training operations on the lands 
owned by the Territory. Puerto Rico argued that such exercises were inconsistent with the island's 
management program. The court avoided the issue of whether there was any exclusion of federal lands 
and did not apply any "directly affecting" threshold test (later in Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 
(C.D. Cal. 1981), modified sub nom. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. 
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984), the district court would focus first on 
whether the activity directly affected the coastal zone and, second, whether there was consistency). 
Instead the court focused on the second requirement that agency action be consistent "to the maximum 
extent practicable" with the territorial management program and concluded that adverse effects from 
the naval bombardments were de minimis. 
101. 16 U.S.C. § 145S(d)(3)(B)(i) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
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government waives its right to comment. 102 Third, the management 
agency, if comments are submitted to it within the thirty-day period, is 
required to consider any such comments, is authorized in its discretion 
to hold a public hearing on such comments, and may not take any 
action within the thirty-day period to implement the management pro-
gram decisions, whether or not modified on the basis of such com-
ments. 103 A state may modify or amend an approved management 
plan so long as the original plan requirements are met. 104 Under the 
1990 amendments, an approved management program may be 
amended if: (1) the state promptly notifies the Secretary of the change 
and submits it for approval with funding subject to suspension by the 
Secretary pending submission; (2) within 30 days of receiving the 
change, the Secretary notifies the state of approval or disapproval or 
that it is necessary to extend review up to 120 days from receipt of this 
change (an extension of the 120-day period only being available for 
meeting the National Environmental Policy Act); and (3) the state 
does not implement any change until after it has been approved by the 
Secretary. ws 
Before granting approval, the Secretary must make a finding that 
the program provides for any one or a combination of designated gen-
eral techniques for control of land and water uses within the coastal 
zones and for a method of assuring that local land and water use regu-
lations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude 
land and water uses of regional benefit. 106 
The state is given a choice among three methods of regulation in 
its program. The designated techniques for control of land and water 
uses are: (1) state establishment of criteria and standards for local im-
plementation, subject to administrative review and enforcement of 
compliance; (2) direct state land and water use planning and regula-
tion; and (3) state administrative review for consistency with the man-
agement program of all development plans, projects, or land and water 
regulations, including exceptions and variances thereto proposed by 
any state or local authority or private developer, with power to ap-
prove or disapprove after public notice and an opportunity for 
hearing. 107 
Approval of a management program is key to receiving the two 
102. Id. § 1455(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
103. Id. § 1455(d)(3)(B)(iii). 
104. /d. § 1455(e). 
105. /d. 
106. /d. § 1455b(e). "Water use" is any "use, activity, or project conducted in or on waters 
within the coastal zone." /d. § 1453(18). 
107. /d. § 1455(d)(11XA)- (C). 
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incentives provided to coastal states in the Act-funding and federal 
consistency. Criticism has been leveled at the inherent assumption in 
the Act that policy requirements and standards are sufficient to pro-
tect an environmental resource. Yet, if the requirements for state pro-
grams were more specific, the CZMA would come close to the most 
controversial form of land control-federal land control. The passage 
of the CZMA was possible because the Act required state programs to 
implement federal policy rather than federal regulations. The state 
may still choose the mix of land and water uses in its program to 
achieve the CZMA's objectives. 
C. Additional Funding and Compliance Under the CZMA 
In cases of "serious disagreement" between any federal agency 
and the coastal state in the development of a management program 
under section 1454 or in the administration of a final management pro-
gram approved under section 1455, "the Secretary, with the coopera-
tion of the Executive Office of the President, shall seek to mediate the 
differences," including public hearings conducted in the local area 
concemed. 108 The procedure, however, is completely voluntary. 109 
The regulations indicate that judicial review may be sought by any 
party to a serious disagreement without first having exhausted the me-
diation process. 110 
To ensure compliance, the Act requires the Secretary to conduct 
a continuing review of the performances of the coastal states. 111 Each 
review must include a written evaluation with an assessment and de-
tailed findings on the extent to which a state has implemented and 
enforced the program, addressed the coastal management needs identi-
fied in section 1452(2)(A)-(K), and complied with the terms of any 
108. 16 U.S.C. § 14S6(h) (198S). For a state's coastal zone management program that includes 
requirements as to shorelands also subject to any federally supported national land use program, the 
Secretary of Commerce must obtain concurrence to that part of the program by the Secretary of the 
Interior or such other designated federal administrator of the land use program prior to approval of the 
program. /d. § 14S6(g). 
109. IS C.F.R. §§ 930.110- 930.116 (1990). 
II 0. /d. § 930.116. One court has required a corporation to exhaust its administrative remedies 
under the CZMA before resorting to the courts. Acme Fill Corp. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & 
Dev. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d IOS6, 232 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1986). 
In Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842,844-47 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 817 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 
1987), the Ninth Circuit held that Exxon was estopped from challenging in court California's finding of 
inconsistency when the Secretary of Commerce had already reviewed and affirmed California's finding 
of inconsistency under IS C.F.R. § 930.121. 807 F.2d 842, 844-41. The court did not decide whether 
Exxon was required to have submitted the issue to the Secretary first, or could have bypassed adminis-
trative review and challenged the finding in district court. /d. at 846. 
Ill. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1458(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
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grant, loan, or cooperative agreement funded under the Act. 112 In 
evaluating compliance, the Secretary must conduct public meetings 
and provide an opportunity for oral and written comments by the pub-
lic, with the final report also being made available to the public. 113 
The Secretary may suspend payments from between six and 36 
months and may withdraw further payments if a state is failing to 
comply with its section 315 program for a national estuarine reserve, 
or a portion of the state's approved management program, or the 
terms of any grant or cooperative agreement funded under the 
CZMA. 114 Before suspension the Secretary must provide the governor 
of the state with written specifications and a schedule for the actions 
that need to be taken and written specifications for how the suspended 
payments must be expended to take the necessary actions. 11 ' Suspen-
sion of funding can be made permanent by the Secretary if the state 
fails to take the necessary corrective actions. 116 
112. /d. 
113. /d. § 14S8(b). 
114. /d. § 14S8(c). 
!IS. Id. § 14S8(cX2). 
116. /d. § 14S8(d). It has been held that the CZMA is neither a jurisdictional grant nor a basis 
for stating a claim for relief. Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482 F. Supp. 900 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Massachusetts v. Andrus, S94 F.2d 872, 880 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1979); but see 
Enos v. March, 616 F. Supp. 32 (D. Haw. 1984), a.ff'd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). The only 
sanction for noncompliance with the formal requirements of the CZMA is termination or reduction of 
program funding. See Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 198S) (citing 16 
U.S.C. §§ 14SS(g) and 14S8(d) (1988), rev'd sub nom. Save our Dunes v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. 
Management, 834 F.2d 984 (lith Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 691 F. Supp. 
1338 (M.D. Ala. 1988)). CZMA requires under § 14S8(d) "withdrawal of financial assistance only if 
the state's deviation is unjustified and the state refuses to remedy the deviation." 642 F. Supp. at 402. 
Under former section 14SS(g), if a state amended or modified its approved program, no further section 
14SS(g) grants could be made to implement its approved program until the amendment or modification 
was approved. 16 U.S.C. § 14SS(g) (1988). In Save Our Dunes, however, the court used its equitable 
powers and refused to remedy a violation of section 14SS(g). 642 F. Supp. at 402. 
A state also may impose penalties for violations under state Jaw. In Government of the Virgin 
Islands, Dep't of Conservation v. Virgin Islands Paving, 714 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1983), the standard for 
issuance of a preliminary injunction under the Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Act was ques-
tioned when an enforcement proceeding was brought in federal court. The defendants allegedly con-
ducted quarry operations in the coastal zone without a permit, and the plaintilfs therefore sought 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties. The district court concluded that 
the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6S(a): threat of 
irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and lack of an adequate remedy at law. /d. at 
28S. The court of appeals refused to accept this test, or one proposed by the government that merely 
required a prima facie showing of a violation. The court of appeals said the district was sitting as a 
local court enforcing Virgin Islands law. /d. at 28S-86. Although the Federal Rules applied, it was 
appropriate to consider local interests as expressed in the coastal law in evaluating irreparable harm 
and in balancing equities. ld. at 286. 
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D. Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants and the Coastal Nonpoint 
Pollution Control Program 
The 1990 Amendments to the CZMA created the Coastal Zone 
Enhancement Grant (CZEG) program. 117 These grants are to be pro-
vided to coastal states for the purpose of attaining any one or more of 
eight enumerated coastal zone enhancement objectives. 118 These 
objectives are: 1) protection of existing coastal wetlands or creation of 
new coastal wetlands; 2) minimization or elimination of development 
in natural hazard areas in order to protect life and property; 3) in-
creased public access to coastal areas having recreational, historical, 
aesthetic, ecological, or cultural value; 4) reduction of marine debris 
through increased management of uses and activities which contribute 
to the presence of such debris in the coastal and ocean environment; 5) 
development and adoption of procedures to control the cumulative 
and secondary impacts created by coastal growth and development; 6) 
preparation and implementation of special area management plans for 
important coastal areas; 7) planned use of ocean resources; and 8) 
adoption of enforceable procedures and policies regarding the siting of 
coastal energy and government facilities having greater than local 
significance. 119 
Coastal states requesting a coastal zone enhancement grant must 
submit a proposal for funding to the Secretary, who will then rank the 
proposals based upon procedural criteria as well as upon the fiscal and 
technical needs of each state and the overall merit, in terms of public 
benefits, of the proposal. 120 The procedural criteria must be adopted 
within twelve months of the enactment of the CZMA amendments, 
following the notice and comment requirements set out in section 
317. 121 The regulations so promulgated must include: 1) specific and 
detailed criteria to be addressed by a coastal state regarding implemen-
tation of the coastal zone enhancement objectives; 122 2) administrative 
and procedural rules to aid "the development and implementation of 
such objectives by coastal states";123 and 3) any other funding award 
criteria necessary to ensure that grants are awarded on the basis of 
objective standards that can be applied "fairly and equitably" to all 
117. Coastal Zone Act rteauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6210, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-309 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456b (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
118. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456h(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
119. /d. § 1456b(a). 
120. /d. § 1456b(c) 
121. /d. § 1456b(d). 
122. /d. § 1456b(d)(l). 
123. /d. § 1456b(d){2). 
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proposals. 124 
The primary benefit to coastal states under the CZEG program is 
that they are not required to contribute to the cost of any program 
funded under the grant. 125 There is, however, an annual cap of 
$10,000,000 to the amount that may be awarded to all proposals 
within a single fiscal year beginning with the 1991 fiscal year. 126 In 
addition, the Secretary may not grant less than 10% and no more than 
20% of all funds appropriated to implement section 306 and 306A to 
fund the enhancement grants program. 127 Funded states are required 
to undertake the actions for which funding was provided under the 
CZEG program or else have their eligibility for further funding sus-
pended by the Secretary for at least one year. 128 
The 1990 amendments also require every state with a federally 
approved program to develop a program to implement coastal land 
use management measures for controlling nonpoint source pollu-
tion. 129 The Administrator of EPA must publish national guidelines 
on "management measures" to control coastal nonpoint sources. 130 
"Management measures" are defined as "economically achievable 
measures" for the control of pollutants from new and existing 
nonpoint sources that reflect the "greatest degree of pollutant reduc-
tion achievable" through application of the best available nonpoint 
pollution control practices and other methods. 131 States must submit 
their programs to the Secretary and the Administrator of EPA within 
30 months of publication of the national guidelines. 132 After approval, 
the state must implement the program through changes in the state 
plan for control of nonpoint source pollution approved under section 
319 of the Clean Water Act133 and through changes in the state's 
coastal zone management program. 134 If the state fails to submit an 
approved program, the Secretary may withhold a percentage of any 
section 306 grant under the CZMA, and EPA may withhold portions 
of any section 319 grant under the Clean Water Act.m Grants are 
124. /d. § 1456b(d)(3). 
125. /d. § 1456b(e). 
126. /d. § 1456b(f). 
127. /d. 
128. /d. § 1456b(g). 
129. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6217, 
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-314 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
130. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b(g)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
131. /d.§ 1455b(g)(5). A state's coastal zone boundaries may be modified to assure control of all 
land and water uses that have a significant impact on state coastal waters. /d. § 1455b(e). 
132. /d. § 1455b(a)(l). 
133. 33 u.s.c. § 1329 (1988). 
134. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b(c)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
135. /d. § 1455b(c)(3) & (4). 
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available for up to SO% of the costs of developing these coastal 
nonpoint pollution control programs. 136 
E. Federal Participation and Consistency Review 
A major incentive for states to have management programs is the 
requirement that certain federal activities be consistent with state 
management programs. The quid pro quo from states for the benefit of 
federal consistency with state programs is that states must adequately 
consider input from federal agencies in formulating state management 
programs. The Secretary may not approve any management program 
pursuant to section 306 unless the views of federal agencies principally 
affected by the program have been adequately considered. 137 Each 
state must provide an opportunity for full partiCipation by relevant 
federal agencies, local governments, and other interested parties. 138 
There are five categories of federal activities subject to consis-
tency review: (1) activities conducted or supported by a federal agency 
"affecting any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal 
zone"; (2) federal development projects "in the coastal zone"; (3) fed-
erally licensed and permitted activities "affecting any land or water 
use or natural resource of the coastal zone"; (4) federally licensed or 
136. Jd. § 14SSb(t). 
137. Jd. § 14S6(h). However, under IS C.P.R. § 923.SI(d) (1990), states have to include only 
those concerns that are "appropriate in the opinion of the State." Implementation of this vague re-
quirement is as difficult as it sounds. In American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. 
Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979), the court upheld the Secretary's approval 
of California's coastal zone management program despite a challenge from the oil industry that the 
program inadequately considered the national interest in energy development. The eourt held that the 
primary concern of the CZMA is environmental protection and that energy needs are merely one of 
several factors to be balanced against environmental concerns. 456 F. Supp. at 922-927. The court also 
held that standard of judicial review for federal approval of a management program is the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. Jd. at 904. The Court rejected having programs so specific as to inform persons 
conducting activities in the coastal zone of the rules and conditions of compliance, because the CZMA 
did not require "detailed criteria" for private developers. Jd. at 919. See also id., 609 F.2d at 1312. 
In the legislative history of the 1990 amendments, the House conference report emphasizes that 
none of the amendments made to the consistency provisions a1fects this last aspect of the Knecht 
holding: 
It is not the intent of the conferees that this subsection be construed to overturn, in whole 
or in part, the judicial decision in American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht. Federal agencies 
and applicants are assured that they will not be subjected to policies which are not enforce-
able under state law. However, this provision is not intended as a guarantee that the provi-
sions of a coastal program will be so specific that users of the coastal zone must be able to 
rely on its provisions as predictive devices for determining the fate of projects without inter-
action with the relevant state agencies. Individual projects must be reviewed on a case-
specific basis and states may identify mitigation and other management measures which are 
not specifically detailed in the management program but which, if implemented, would 
allow the state to find projects consistent with the enforceable policies of the program. 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 972, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 2374, 2677. 
138. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14SS(d)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
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permitted activities described in detail in OCS plans "affecting any 
land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone"; and (5) 
federal assistance to state and local governments "affecting any land or 
water use or natural resource of the coastal zone!' 139 
Every federal agency conducting or financially supporting140 ac-
tivities in or outside the zone affecting the coastal zone and every fed-
eral agency undertaking any development project141 in a state coastal 
zone must conduct the activities or project, "to the maximum extent 
practicable," consistent with the "enforceable policies"142 of the state 
program. Federal agencies providing financial assistance to state and 
local governments also must do so consistently with the enforceable 
policies of approved state management programs. 143 Moreover, any 
applicant for a required federal license or permit to conduct an activity 
in or outside the zone affecting a state's coastal zone must "provide in 
the application to the licensing or permitting agency a certification 
that the proposed activity complies with the enforceable policies of the 
state's approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a 
manner consistent with the program."144 
The requirements for consistency review, as well as when those 
requirements must be met, vary depending upon the type of federal 
activity at issue and whether it must affect or be conducted in the 
coastal zone. 
In summary, consistency review is required for federal activities 
affecting the coastal zone under section 1456(c)(l), for federal develop-
ment projects in the coastal zone under section 1456(c)(2), for applica-
tions for federal licenses or permits affecting the coastal zone under 
section 1456(c)(3)(A), for OCS post-lease sale activities affecting the 
coastal zone under section 1456(c)(3)(B), and for federal funding for 
state or local projects affecting the coastal zone under section 1456(d). 
For federal licenses or permits, perhaps the most frequently oc-
curring situation covered by the consistency provisions, the state or 
designated agency must receive a copy of the certification with all nee-
139. /d. § 14S6(c), (d). 
140. Id. § 14S6(cXI). 
141. Id. § 14S6(cX2). 
142. "Enforceable policy" is defined as "State policies which are legally binding through constitu-
tional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions, 
by which a State exerts control over private and public land and water uses and natural resources in the 
coastal zone." /d. § 14S3(6a). 
143. /d. § 14S6(d). 
144. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(A). Under the CZMA, the burden of establishing compliance with a state 
program is on the federal agency proposing the contemplated action. Conservation Law Found. v. 
Watt, S60 F. Supp. S61, S76 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 
1983). 
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essary information and data. 145 "At the earliest practicable time," the 
state or designated agency must notify the federal agency concerned 
that it concurs with or objects to the certification. 146 No federal li-
cense or permit can be granted without state concurrence, unless the 
Secretary (on his own initiative or upon appeal by the applicant) finds, 
after providing a reasonable opportunity for detailed comments from 
the federal agency and state involved, that the activity is consistent 
with the objectives of the Act or is otherwise necessary in the interest 
of national security. 147 
F. Offshore Leasing Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act and the CZMA 
The most controversial consistency determinations have involved 
oil and gas lease activities in the outer continental shelf. Any plan for 
the exploration, development, or production in any area leased under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)148 that affects any 
land or water use or natural resource of a coastal zone must have at-
tached a certification that each activity detailed in the plan complies 
with the enforceable policies of a state's management program and 
will be carried out consistently with that program. 149 No federal li-
cense or permit can be granted for any such activity until the state or 
14!1. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14!16(c)(3)(A) (West 198!1 & Supp. 1991). Each coastal state must establish 
procedures for public notice for such certification, and, to the extent it deems appropriate, procedures 
for public hearings in connection therewith. /d. 
146. /d. Failure of the state or designated agency to furnish this required notification within six 
months of receipt of the certification is conclusively presumed as concurrence by the state with the 
certification. /d. 
147. /d. 
148. 43 u.s.c. § 1331-13!16 (1988). 
149. 16 U.S.C. § 14!16(c)(3)(B) (1988). There is also in the OCSLA a provision for an oil spill 
liability fund to pay to remove any oil spilled as a result of OCS development and to pay for any 
resulting damage. Administered by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Transportation, the Oft'shore 
Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is financed through a surtax per barrel on oil produced in the OCS 
and by fines, penalties, and reimbursement. Any United States resident, federal or state agency, or 
political subdivision may recover for economic losses or environmental damages and for, among other 
things, injuries to the use of property or natural resources including loss of profits. Owners and opera-
tora of vessels and oft'shore facilities are essentially responsible in limited strict liability for oil spills. 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1812-1814 (198!1). A district court refused to uphold the Secretary of the Interior's consis-
tency certification for a lease sale despite similar aims and goals between state and federal regulatory 
schemes and significant future state participation. Its determination that the OCS lease sale directly 
aft'ected the coastal zone is questionable in light of Secretary of the Interior v. Colifornill. Conserv. Law 
Found. v. Watt, !160 F. Supp. !161, 578 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Committee of Mass. v. Watt, 
716 F.2d 946 (lst Cir. 1983). 
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill oft' Alaska in March 1989, Congress passed comprehen-
sive oil spill legislation after fifteen years of unsuccessful attempts to pass such legislation. The Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-380) is discussed in [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1264 (Nov. 2, 1990). 
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designated agency receives the certification, the plan, and any other 
necessary information and the state or designated agency concurs with 
the certification and so notifies the Secretaries of Commerce and the 
Interior. !so The state's concurrence is conclusively presumed if there 
is no verification within six months of receipt of the certification.''' 
The state may provide the Secretary, the appropriate federal agency, 
and the applicant with a written statement on the status of review and 
the basis for further delay. 1s2 If the state objects to the certification, 
the Secretary may nevertheless find that the activity is consistent with 
the objectives of the chapter or that it is otherwise necessary in the 
interest of national security. 1 sJ If a state objects and the Secretary fails 
to make such a finding or if the applicant fails to comply with the plan 
as submitted, the applicant must submit either an amended or a new 
plan to the Secretary of the Interior. 1s4 
It has been estimated that as much as 60% of this country's un-
discovered oil and gas resources are in the outer continental shelf. m 
During the Reagan administration, efforts were made to increase fed-
eral leasing in the continental shelf while seeking to eliminate funding 
for many ocean and coastal programs. 1s6 It is perhaps for these rea-
sons that most litigation and scholarly articles have focused on the 
interrelationships between OCSLA leasing and the CZMA. 1s1 
ISO. 16 U.S.C. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(i) (1988). 
lSI. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(A). 
152. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
153. Id. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(iii). 
I 54. For the amended or new plan, state concurrence will be conclusively presumed after 3 
months. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(B). 
ISS. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANES FOR OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT EM0.81·S9, at I (1981). 
156. See Dep't of Health & Human Services, Proposed S-Year OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Pro-
gram, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981); and Eliopoulos, Coastal Zone Management: Program at the Cross-
roads, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 30 (September 17, 1982). 
157. For more information on the conftict between the states and the federal government over 
leasing in the coastal zone, see generally on the so-called "seaweed rebellion," Fitzgerald, Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Revenue Sharing: A Proposal to End the Seaweed Rebellion, S UCLA J. OF ENVTL. L. & 
PoL'Y I (1985); Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Devel-
opment, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. S3S (1982); Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing 
Federal-State Conflicts in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 83 (1984). See also 
Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract Selections and Lease Stipula-
tions Be Consistent with State Coastal Zone Management Programs? 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. lOS 
(1980); Comment, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Offshore Oil and Gas Devel-
opment, II EcOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1984); Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer 
Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159 (1982); Comment, Cooperative Federalism 
for the Coastal Zone and the Outer Continental Shelf: A Legislative Proposal, 1983 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. 
L. REV. 123; Note, Federal "Consistency" Under the Coastal Zone Management Act-A Promise Bro-
ken by Secretary of the Interior v. California, IS ENVTL. L. 153 (1984); Note, Outer Continental Shelf 
Leasing Policy Prevails Over the California Coastal Commission, 24 NAT. RES. 1. 1133 (1984); Com-
ment, Reappraisal of State's Interests in Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales Under the Coastal Zone 
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Under the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) passed in 1953, states 
were granted quitclaim title to the lands three miles seaward of the 
coastline. 1' 8 Under the OCSLA, the federal government has jurisdic-
tion over the outer continental shelf beyond the three mile bound-
ary.1'9 As a result of domestic energy shortages in the early 1970's, 160 
the OCS leasing program was pursued more aggressively. In 1978, 
largely to expedite outer continental shelf development and to mini-
mize state interference, 161 Congress passed amendments that divided 
development into four stages: (1) development of a five year OCSLA 
leasing program; (2) lease sales; (3)·exploration; and (4) development 
and production. 162 To balance the need for energy against coastal 
state interests, §§ 19 and 25 of the OCSLA established procedures for 
coordination and consideration between the Department of the Inte-
rior and the governors of affected coastal states}63 Section 19 was 
designed to ensure that states would have an opportunity for input 
into decisionmaking on proposed lease sales which would affect their 
Management Act: Secretary of the Interior v. California, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. LAW 277 
(1985). 
158. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988). In 1845, the Supreme Court decision in Pollard's Lessee 
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), indicated that the states' held title to the submerged lands of all 
navigable waters including those in the coastal zone. 
159. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56, 1801-66 (1988). In 1947, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947), that the federal government had paramounfrights over the conti-
nental shelf. See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (the United States has sovereign 
rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean lying more than three geographical 
miles seaward from the ordinary low water mark and extending seaward to the outer edge of the Conti-
nental Shelf). 
160. See generally, Special Message to the Congress on Energy Resources, 195 PUB. PAPERS 709 
(June 4, 1971); Address to the Nation about Policies to Deal with the Energy Shortages, 323 PuB. 
PAPERS 916 (Nov. 7, 1973); Special Message to the Congress on the Energy Crises, 17 PUB. PAPERS 29 
(Jan. 23, 1974). 
161. Jd. 
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344 (five year program), 1345 (lease sale), 1340 (exploration), 1351 (develop-
ment and prediction) (1988). Only after the leases are awarded, do the lessees submit an exploratory 
plan to the Department for approval, id. § 1340(cXl), followed by a production and development plan 
prior to drilling. /d.§ 135l(aXl). Administration of the leasing is done by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement. The Bureau initially selects and schedules for leasing areas of the outer continental shelf. 
Data on oil and gas reserves are then compiled. A call for bids is published in the Federal Register. 
After reviewing bids, the Bureau selects individual tracts for leasing and prepares draft and then final 
environmental impact statements. See Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: FetJ.erai-Stat~ Conflicts Over Off-
shore Oil and Gas Development, supra note 157, at 538-39. Governors of affected coastal states may 
submit comments on the size, timing, and location of a proposed lease sale. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988). 
The Secretary of the Interior may accept such recommendations if they "provide for a reasonable bal-
ance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State." Jd. § 134S(c). 
Final notice of the sale is published in the Federal Register. Purchase of a lease gives the purchaser a 
right to conduct "preliminary activities" on the leased tract. Before actual exploration, plans must be 
submitted to and approved by the Secretary. Subsequently, another plan for development must also be 
submitted for approval and is subject to comments by the governors of affected states. When approved, 
only then can <!evelopment and production commence. /d. §§ 1345(a) - (c), 1351. 
163. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1345(a) - (c), 1351 (1988). 
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coastal areas. 164 In 1976, Congress amended the CZMA to address its 
interrelationship with the OCSLA. 165 Also in 1976, Congress estab-
lished the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) to provide funds to 
coastal states to compensate for their costs of coastal energy develop-
ment. 166 Secretarial mediation was provided for state and federal disa-
greement over consistency of a lease plan. 167 
Most litigation has focused on § 18 of the OCSLA 168 governing 
the five year leasing program169 and on the Secretary of the Interior's 
interpretation of "directly affecting" in § 307(c)(1)170 of the CZMA 
before the 1990 amendments. 171 These provisions reveal the uneasy 
balance of federal and state power in the CZMA. In offshore energy 
development, the national interest in energy production frequently 
conflicts with states' environmental concerns. So far, states have been 
the losers in the battle. 
1. Challenges to Formulation of a Five-Year Leasing Plan 
Under Section 18 of the OCSLA 
The Secretary of the Interior is required under § 18 of the OC-
SLA to develop a five year leasing program to set the size, timing, and 
location of leasing activities to meet energy needs by considering a 
variety of factors172 and balancing energy potential, environrpental ef-
164. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53, reprinted in U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 1450, 1457-58. 
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(cX3)(B) (1988). 
166. /d. § 1456a. The program was eliminated in the 1990 amendments. See II(G), infra. 
167. IS C.P.R. § 930.85 (1990). 
168. 43 u.s.c. § 1344 (1988). 
169. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981), appeal after remand, 712 F.2d 
584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). . 
170. 16 u.s.c. § 1456(cXI) (1988). 
171. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464" U.S. 312 (1984). 
172. Under section 18(aX2), there must be consideration of: 
(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological character-
istics of such regions; 
(B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the vari-
ous regions; 
(C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and 
national energy markets; 
(D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including 
fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential sites of deepwater ports, and 
other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf; 
(E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas re-
sources as indicated by exploration or nomination; 
(F) laws, goals, and policies of alfected States which have been specifically identified by the 
Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's consideration; 
(G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of dilferent areas of the 
outer Continental Shelf; and 
(H) relevant environmental and predictive information for dill'erent areas of the outer Con-
tinental Shelf. 
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fects, and adverse impacts on the coastal zone. 173 The first five year 
plan was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in June, 1980.174 In 
the following month the plan was challenged in court by Alaska, Cali-
fornia, the North Slope ·Borough of Alaska, and the National Re-
sources Defense Council on the grounds that § 18 had been 
violated. 175 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that factual conclusions under the OCSLA would be upheld· if sup-
ported by substantial evidence, policy decisions would be upheld if not 
arbitrary and capricious, and that questions of law would be reviewed 
de novo by the court. 176 The court held that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior: (1) had not defined lease sales in the program "as precisely as 
possible"; 177 (2) had not considered the equitable sharing of develop-
ment benefits and environment risks among regions as required by 
§ 18(a)(2)(B);178 (3) did not consider the relative environmental sensi-
tivity and marine productivity of different areas as required by 
§ 18(a)(2)(G);179 and (4) had not properly balanced the potential for 
energy discovery, environmental damage, and adverse coastal zone im-
pacts in selecting the timing or location of lease sales as required by 
§ 18(a)(3) due to his failure to consider adequately the § 18(a)(2) 
factors. 180 
In July 1981, Secretary of Interior James Watt submitted to Con-
gress a new five year leasing program. 181 In October 1981, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the prior program back to the De-
partment of the Interior with a schedule for compliance with its opin-
ion.182 Accordingly, Watt's own program with an area to be leased 25 
43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX2)(A)-(H) (1988). 
173. Id. § 1344(aX3). 
174. California v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
17S. Id. at 1290. 
176. Id. at 1301-1303. 
177. Id. at 1303-1304. Section 17 requires the Secretary in the leasing schedule to demonstrate 
"as precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity which he determines will best 
meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its approval or reapproval." 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a) (1988). 
178. 668 F.2d at 1304-1308. The court stated environmental risks were not solely dependent 
upon the likelihood of an oil spill, but were dependent on both the probability and amount of damage. 
ld. at 1308. 
179. 668 F.2d at 1311-1313. The Secretary had argued it would be impossible to do meaningful 
area comparisons as required. Id. at 1312. The Court held that speculative information might be 
utilized to make a good faith eft'ort toward compliance. Id. at 1313. 
180. ld. at 1318. Section 18(aX3) requires that the Secretary select the "timing and location of 
leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance between the potential for 
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse 
impact on the coastal zone." 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (1988), 
181. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981). 
182. 668 F.2d 1290. 
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times greater than the area leased throughout the entire history of the 
OCSLA program was revised and approved by Watt in July 1982.183 
Alaska, California, Florida, Oregon, and Washington brought suit to 
challenge the program's validity,l84 claiming that§ 18 of the OCSLA, 
as well as the 1981 Watt I decision, had 'bdm violated. Although 
claiming to utilize the standards of review set out in Watt I, the Court 
in Watt II characterized many of the issues as focusing on the inade-
quacy of the Secretary's analysis, which could only be s~t aside as arbi-
trary and capriCious. Thus, despite similarities to several of the claims 
upheld in Watt I, the Court held that Watt had complied with§ 18 of 
the OCSLA. 185 
Thus far, the only limitations on the five year leasing programs 
have been imposed by Congress. In·1983, President Reagan.signed a 
Department of the Interior appropriations bill with a moratorium on 
certain leases through the fiscal year of 1984. 186 The moratorium was 
continued through fiscal year 1985. 187 Under Public Law Number 99-
190, passed in 1985, the moratorium was again continued for areas in 
the North Atlantic, but the Department of the Interior and California 
were to negotiate a suitable agreement on moratoriums for lease areas 
off the coast of California. 188 On June 26, 1990, President Bush can-
celled five proposed oil and gas lease sales which included three sales 
off the coast of California, one off the Florida coast, and one in the 
North Atlantic, making most of the tracts unavailable for leasing con-
sideration until after the year 2000. Eighty-seven tracts within the 
Santa Maria Basin and Santa Barbara channel would be available for 
leasing consideration after January 1, 1996, if studies demonstrate that 
drilling is environmentally sound. 189 
183. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVBSTJGA TIONS OF THE HOUSE CoM-
MITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CoNG., 1ST SBSS., SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 
JAMBS G. WATT'S FIVE YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PLAN FOR THE OUTER CoNTINENTAL SHELF 6 
(Comm. Print No.4, 1983). 
184. California v. Watt (Watt II), 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A companion suit was also 
brought by seven environmental groups. /d. at 590. The plaintiff's claimed that the Secretary had: (I) 
failed to indicate the "size, timing, and location of leasing activity as precisely as possible"; (2) failed to 
choose his program on § 18(a)(2) factors; (3) violated § 18(a)(3) by arbitrary assumptions and errone-
ous procedures; (4) failed to assure the receipt of fair market value under§ 18(a)(4); (5) failed to con-
sider environmental impacts of the program under §§ 18(a)(l)-(3) and the National Environmental 
Policy Act; and (6) violated § 18(1) by failing to specify when a consistency determination had to be 
done. Fitzgerald, supra note 157, at 11 n. 73. 
185. 712 F.2d at 590. 
186. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
146, §§ 108-109, 97 Stat. 919, 934-37 (1983). 
187. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 108, 98 Stat. 1837, 1853-55 (1984). 
188. Act of Dec. 9, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, §§ 107, 149, 99 Stat. 1185, 1241-43, 1325-26 
(1985); [Current Developments] 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1661-1662 (December 27, 1985). 
189. [CUrrent Developments] 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 413 (Jun. 29, 1990). 
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The conflict between state control and federal power shows no 
signs of abating. The new five year leasing plan proposed for 1987 to 
1992 met with immediate opposition from congressional representa-
tives for coastal states. 190 One bill was introduced to repeal legisla-
tively · the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v. 
California 191 restricting consistency review and to give the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, rather than the Department of Interior, the 
authority to set air pollution standards for offshore drilling rigs. 192 
Also, a NOAA preliminary issue paper, written in response to the 
reauthorization of the CZMA in April of 1986, was attacked vigor-
ously by state regulators and environmentalists, who claimed it would 
intrude even further into state control of coastal areas. 193 
2. Sections 307(c)(l) and 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA and 
Consistency Review for OCSLA Lease Sales 
Prior to the 1990 amendments, section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA 
required that federal activity "directly affecting" a state's coastal zone 
be done "in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, 
consistent with approved state management programs."194 In July, 
1980, the California Coastal Commission asked the Department of the 
Interior to submit a consistency determination at the time the Depart-
ment published its proposed Notice of Sale for Lease oft' the coast of 
California. 195 The Department of the Interior refused to submit a con-
sistency determination because of its view that the proposed notice of 
sale did not "directly affect" the coastal zone and thus did not require 
a consistency determination under § 307(c)(1). 196 Both the. district 
court197 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals198 rejected the De-
partment's position that activities "directly affecting" the coastal zone 
190. [Current Developments]18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 239 (May 8, 1987). 
191. 464 u.s. 312 (1984). 
192. H.R. 1876, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987). See also [Current Developments], supra note 190, at 
240. Frequently, even if ofFshore drilling rigs are found to be consistent with an applicable state pro-
gram, control of air pollution requirements administered by the EPA may still prevent construction and 
operation of the rig. Hearing, supra note 1, at 63. 
193. [Current Developments] 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1149 (Nov. 7, 1986). 
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1988). 
195. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1258-1259 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., Secretary of 
the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
196. For a detailed analysis of the positions of California and the Department of the Interior, see 
Linsley, Federal Consistency and Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: The Application of the 
"Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-Lease Sale Activities, 9 B. C. ENvn. AFF. L. REv. 431 (1980). 
197. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), 
rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
198. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom, Secretary. of the Interior v. 
California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
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were only those activities that physically affected the coastal zones so 
that consistency review was limited to activities during the actual ex-
ploration, development, and production stages. 
The Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 199 
however, upheld the Department's position in a closely decided opin-
ion on slightly different grounds than those argued by the Department. 
Justice O'Connor focused on the remaining lease sale in controversy-
lease sale 53, which included the Santa Maria Basin, an important 
habitat of the sea otter.200 In holding that only federal activities within 
the coastal zone could directly affect the coastal zone, the court relied 
on the legislative history of the CZMA. Congress's rejection of four 
proposals to extend the CZMA beyond three miles201 and of a specific 
proposal to make OCSLA leasing subject to consistency review 
demonstrated to the Court a congressional intent to exclude OCSLA 
leasing from review.202 In addition, the separation of OCSLA devel-
opment into four stages was interpreted as a congressional decision to 
separate OCSLA lease sales from the later two stages of development 
for purposes of consistency review under§ 307(c)(3)(B).203 According 
to Justice O'Connor, the purchase of an OCS lease entailed no right to 
explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas resources that would trigger 
§ 307(c)(3)(B) consistency review. Section 307(c)(l) consistency re-
view was not triggered because the phrase "directly affecting" was 
"aimed at including activities conducted or supported by federal agen-
cies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal zone but ex-
cluded from the zone"204 as defined in the CZMA. Even if OCS lease 
sales were an activity conducted or supported by a federal agency 
under§ 301(c)(l), lease sales would have no direct effect on the coastal 
zone because they authorized only very limited "preliminary activi-
ties" on the OCS. 205 
In a strong dissent by Justice Stevens, California's arguments 
before the Court were generally accepted. Justice Stevens found that 
the language and legislative history of the CZMA, as well as its pur-
pose, did not support the majority's position. 206 He pointed out the 
savings clause in OCSLA, which specifically states that nothing in that 
Act is to be construed to interfere with the consistency procedure re-
199. 464 U.S. 312 (1984). The decision, written by Justice O'Connor, was decided by a 5·4 vote. 
/d. 
200. /d. at 318. 
201. /d. at 324-30. 
202. /d. 
203. /d. 
204. /d. at 330. 
205. /d. at 342. 
206. /d. at 345 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
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quirements of the CZMA. 207 The express goal of the CZMA is to 
encourage coordination between states and federal agencies, a goal de-
feated by the majority's holding. 208 According to the dissent, nothing 
in the language of the Act distinguished between in-zone and out-of-
zone activities in determining whether there was a direct effect on the 
coastal zone under § 307(c)(l).209 If anything, the term "directly af-
fecting" the coastal zone was intended to include within consistency 
review those-activities which, in part, do not occur in coastal zones.210 
There are three possible grounds for the majority decision. The 
first and broadest is that oil and gas leases are not subject to consis-
tency review under § 307(c)(l) because they are activities outside the 
coastal zone. · Second, the Court may have simply found that lease 
sales were specifically excluded by Congress from consistency review 
under § 307(c)(3)(B). Third, the Court may have held that even if 
lease sales are covered by § 307(c)(l), they do not directly affect the 
coastal zone. It is the first and broadest interpretation that is the most 
troublesome-that federal activities under § 307(c)(l) must be con-
ducted within the coastal zone to directly affect it and thus be subject 
to consistency review. 
The opinion has been intensely criticized. 211 In addition to the 
criticisms suggested in the dissent, it has been pointed out that the 
CZMA was enacted largely in response to the 1969 oil well blow-out 
and extensive damage in the Santa Barbara Channel on OCS lands 
outside of the California coastal zone.212 Also, in suggesting that the 
1978 amendments to the OCSLA repealed any express or implied pre-
vious requirement of consistency review, Justice O'Connor essentially 
ignored the 1978 amendment which included a savings clause ex-
pressly preserving the provisions of the 1972 CZMA.213 
The majority's interpretation of § 307(c)(1) consistency review 
can be criticized as well from a policy perspective. Meaningful envi-
ronmental decisionmaking can only be made at the point in decision-
making when environmental values are not yet clearly outweighed by 
investment costs already expended toward a project. Although OCS 
lease sales only entitle lessees to priority in submission of development 
plans, this commitment entails significant expenditures and adminis-
207. /d. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
208. /d. at 345-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
209. /d. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
210. /d. at 355-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
211. See generally the articles in note 157 supra. 
212. Grosso, supra note 8, at 272. 
213. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to amend, modify, or repeal any provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 
.... " 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (1985). 
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trative action.214 The further along in the process that consistency re-
view is required, the less likely it is that a lessee will have to do 
anything more than file the necessary paperwork. 
The second policy based criticism that can be leveled is a more 
general one regarding the very nature of environmental decisionmak-
ing. The Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v. Cali-
fornia is consistent with the Court's recent propensity toward 
segmentation of consideration of environmental impacts/15 combined 
with an unwillingness to impose additional procedures to ensure 
meaningful consideration.216 Unfortunately, the environment is not as 
easily segmented. What occurs one mile within a coastal zone or one 
mile outside of it is a distinction without a difference. In collectively 
shared environments--air, water, and ocean-all relevant environ-
mental impacts must be considered, regardless of the location of their 
source.217 The CZMA was a significant step toward a realistic, en-
compassing view of environmental protection, a step forward from 
which the Supreme Court retreated.218 
In the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, section 307(c)(l) was 
amended to read in its entirety as follows: 
(c)(l)(A) Each Federal agency activity within or outside the 
coastal zone that affeets any land or water use or natural resource 
of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is con-
sistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable 
policies of approved State management programs. A Federal 
agency activity shall be subject to this paragraph unless it is subject 
to paragraph (2) or (3). 
(B) After any final judgment, decree, or order of any Federal 
court tJtat is appealable under section 1291 or 1292 of title 28, 
214. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Secretary may not terminate 
a lease at will without compensating the lessee for substantial investments. Union Oil Co. of California 
v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975). 
215. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
216. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
u.s. 519 (1978). 
217. The environmental impacts include the possibility of an oil spill, air pollution from hydro-
carbon emissions from the loading of oil onto barges or tankers, aesthetic harm, noise pollution, and 
increased population and traffic in the fragile coastal area. Economic repercussions for the coastal state 
include major onshore development such as pipeline landfalls, harbor supply bases, refineries and deep-
water ports, harm to tourism, increased population in the coastal area, and increased local governmen-
tal costs. See Grosso, supro note 8, at 274. 
218. For further criticism of California v. Watt and legislative responses to the decision, see Case-
note, Secretary of Interior v. California: Its Direct Effects on the Coastal Zone Management Act, 8 
GI!ORGE MASON U.L. REv. 197 (1985). Many scholarly articles focusing on the CZMA have been 
addressed to the interpretation of "directly affecting" in § 307(cXI). See, e.g., (in addition to the arti-
cles previously cited in note 157, supro), O'Connor, Clark v. California: A New ApproVGI to Federol 
Consistency and the Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sale Process, 3 COOLEY L. REv. 473 (1985). 
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United States Code, or under any other applicable provision of 
Federal law, that a specific Federal agency activity is not in com-
pliance with subparagraph (A), and certification by the Secretary 
that mediation under subsection (b) is not likely to result in such 
compliance, the President may, upon written request from the Sec-
retary, exempt from compliance those elements of the Federal 
agency activity that are found by the Federal court to be inconsis-
tent with an approved State program, if the President determines 
that the activity is in the paramount interest of the United States. 
No such exemption shall be granted on the basis of a lack of appro-
priations unless the President has specifically requested such ap-
propriations as part of the 'budgetary process, and the Congress 
has failed to make available the requested appropriations. 
(C) Each Federal Agency carrying out an activity subject to 
paragraph (1) shall provide a consistency determination to the rel-
evant State agency designated under section 1455(d)(6) of this title 
at the earliest practicable time, but in no case later than 90 days 
before final approval of the Federal activity unless both the Fed-
eral agency and the State agency agree to a different schedule. 219 
The first subsection of this provision overturns Secretary of the Interior 
v. California by subjecting OCSLA oil and gas lease sales to the consis-
tency requirements of section 307(c)(l). The second subsection is new 
and authorizes a Presidential exemption if the activity is in the para-
mount interest of the United States, a standard exemption provided in 
a number of other environmental statutes. Technical changes in the 
other consistency provisions of sections 307(c)(3)(A) and 307(d) cou-
pled with the new section 307(c)(l) make it clear that any federal 
agency activity that affects any natural resources, land uses, or water 
uses in the coastal zone are subject to consistency review regardless of 
whether the activity is in or outside the coastal zone. 220 The House 
conference report states that, in evaluating whether or not the federal 
agency activity may affect the coastal zone, consideration must be 
given to effects that the federal agency: 
may reasonably anticipate as a result of its action, including cumu-
lative and secondary effects. Therefore, the term "affecting" is to 
be construed broadly, including direct effects which are caused by 
the activity and occur at the same time and place, and indirect 
effects which may be caused by the activity and are later in time or 
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. 221 
219. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-S08, 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-307 § 6208 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(cX1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
220. /d. 
221. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 970-71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2374, 2675-76. · 
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There have been recurring suggestions for reform of coastal zone 
management, mostly focusing on consistency review of OCSLA leas-
ing. One such proposal is revenue sharing of OCSLA leasing revenues 
with states. 222 Although this proposal perhaps would soften coastal 
states' antagonism to offshore leasing, it would at best counterbalance 
cuts in federal funding for the CZMA grants and at worst undermine 
the objectives of environmental protection in the CZMA. 223 Another 
suggestion is the use of a less biased mediation panel in place of the 
Secretary of Commerce to mediate disputes between the federal and 
state governments. An ad hoc panel would be formed of one represen-
tative each from the state coastal agency, the governor's office, the 
Departments of the Interior and Commerce, and the petroleum indus-
try.224 But not only would state representatives still be a minority, the 
new panel would do nothing to revise the reviewability or grounds for 
review of federal activities. Numerous proposals have also been made 
to amend the CZMA, frequently to overrule the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 225 as was done in the 
1990 amendments. Yet all these measures are piecemeal attempts to 
give the CZMA, particularly in its relationship to the OCSLA, the 
strength originally envisioned for the Act in 1972. That strength was 
illusory from the beginning. States were given virtually unlimited dis-
cretion in the designation of coastal areas deserving of protection and 
were left to their own devices in specifying permissible land and water 
uses so long as the lofty but general objectives of the Act were satis-
fied. Only in 1980 was the Secretary even authorized to withhold 
funding from coastal states for failing to satisfy the Act's require-
ments. 226 Consistency review for offshore leasing suffers from a simi-
lar lack of guidance for the respective priorities to be given to energy 
development and to environmental preservation. As formulated, this 
222. Comment, Cooperative Federalism for the Coastal Zone and the Outer Continental Shelf: A 
Legislative Proposal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 123 (1983); Fitzgerald, Outer Continental Shelf Revenue 
Sharing: A Proposal to End the Seaweed Rebellion, S UCLA J. ENvn.. L. & PoL'Y 1 (198S). 
223. Grosso, supra note 8, at 283. 
224. Note, Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Policy Prevails Over the California Coastal Commis-
sion, 24 NAT. REsoURCES J. 1133 (1984). 
22S. See, e.g., S. 2384, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 4S89, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); 
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (DNA) 734 (July 3, 1987). One frequent criticism of current 
coastal zone management is of the lack of funding for scientific research. The National Ocean Pollution 
Planning Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709 (1988), provides for the establishment of a comprehen-
sive plan for the overall federal effort in ocean pollution research and development and monitoring, 
with the NOAA as the lead federal agency. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to make grants 
to coastal states to acquire lands and waten as necessary to ensure the long term management of an 
area as a national estuarine reserve, to conduct educational activities, or to support research and moni-
toring within a national estuarine reserve. 16 U.S. C. § 1461 ( 1988). 
226. 16 U.S.C. § 14S8 (1988). 
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necessary but difficult evaluation is avoided by a process that invites 
federal-state conflicts. With any environmentally controversial off-
shore leasing, the state will understandably be inclined to utilize its 
role in the consistency review process to elevate its own management 
program and localized environmental concerns over national energy 
needs. Similarly, by the time a private applicant pursues an OCS 
lease, the federal administration is substantially committed to such de-
velopment through the Secretary of the Interior's designation of the 
area for offshore leasing as part and parcel of a national energy policy. 
The consistency process intensifies the adversarial positions of the in-
volved state and federal agencies with no substantive criteria for reso-
lution of the conflict. Indeed, the Secretary of Commerce, who serves 
as the ultimate arbitrator in cases . of conflict, is only authorized to 
approve leasing that is consistent with the state program or necessary 
to national security.227 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Secre-
tary's mediation is rarely utilized, as the difficult conflicts involve leas-
ing that is ostensibly inconsistent with the state program and not 
necessary to national security, but that is, nevertheless, a potentially 
important source of energy resources. 
G. The Coastal Energy Impact Program 
Prior to 1990, states with approved coastal programs could re-
ceive financial assistance to fund public facilities and services and to 
remedy environmental consequences of energy development in the 
coastal zone. Under the Coastal Energy Impact Program as it was set 
out in section 308 of the CZMA, grants, loans, loan guarantees, and 
other financial assistance were to be provided to states to implement 
its provisions.228 The program was created in 1976 to ameliorate the 
effects of energy development on the coastal states and, in part, to 
obviate state delay of federal OCS leasing plans. 229 
In October of 1990, when the lOlst Congress passed the Coastal 
Zone Management Reauthorization· Act amendments as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,230 one major change was 
the elimination of the Coastal Energy Impact Program231 which was 
replaced by a newly created, much more limited Coastal Zone Man-
227. Id § 1456. 
228. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1988). 
229. H.R. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1820, 1820.21. 
230. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). 
231. 16 u.s.c. § 1456 (1988). 
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agement Fund. 232 
The Fund will consist of amounts received from the repayment of 
loans made to state and local governments under section 308(a) of the 
CZMA. 233 These funds may then be used, at the discretion of the 
Secretary, to cover administrative expenses created by the Act in 
amounts up to specified limits for fiscal years 1991 through 1995.234 
Following such allocation, funds may be used for: 
a) projects addressing regional and inter-state coastal zone 
management issues, 235 
b) demonstration projects, particularly local level projects, 
having a high potential for improving coastal zone 
management, 236 
c) emergency grants to enable state coastal zone management 
agencies to respond to unforeseen or disaster-related 
circumstances, 237 
d) awards to recognize excellence in coastal zone manage-
ment under section 314,238 
e) program development grants pursuant to section 305239 
and, 
f) financial support to coastal states for use in implementing 
state coastal zone management programs which are ap-
proved under section 306 and which have investigated and 
applied the public trust doctrine in such implemen-
tation.240 
Finally, the Secretary is required to provide Congress with an annual 
report detailing the balance of the Fund and an itemization of receipts 
and expenses on December 1 of each year. 241 
III. COASTAL REGULATION AND THE TAKING ISSUE 
When a state regulates to protect its coastal zone, the protective 
regulation is almost inevitably a restriction on growth and develop-
ment. After the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Trans-
232. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-308 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). 
233. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456a(b)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). 
234. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(A). 
235. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(i). 
236. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
237. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
238. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(iv). 
239. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(v). 
240. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(vi). 
241. /d. § 1456a(b)(3). 
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port. Co. v. New York City, 242 the legal possibility that a regulatory 
interference with private property could be an unconstitutional "tak-
ing" raised the spectre of litigation over coastal zone regulation. The 
disincentive to such litigation, however, was developed in a series of 
taking cases following Penn Central. 243 According to these cases, the 
factors to be taken into consideration when determining if a regulation 
works a taking are "the character of the governmental action, its eco-
nomic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment backed 
expectations."244 Perhaps more importantly, the opinion in Penn Cen-
tral suggested that for a taking to occur, the regulation must deprive a 
landowner of all or almost all reasonable economic return on the 
property. 24s 
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court markedly deviated from its 
established approach to the taking clause, casting a pall over innova-
tive, and some traditional, fonns of land use regulation. The three 
cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 246 First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,241 and Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n,248 clearly signified a shift in the Court's 
interpretation of what constitutes a "regulatory taking." 
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, and the approach generally 
taken in the cases which followed, was to first determine which of the 
so-called "bundle of sticks" constituting property had been taken (for 
example, the right to exclude others) and then to determine how im-
portant that "stick" is to the use or economic value of the property. If 
that property right is of an as yet unspecified level of significance to 
the economic value or use of the property, then its deprivation alone 
may constitute a taking. 
In sum, the nature of the property right taken becomes more im-
portant than what property rights remain. Thus, deprivation of a sin-
gle property right, the right to exclude others, may be a taking without 
regard to the economic value of any remaining rights in the prop-
erty. 249 As such, it becomes more and more difficult to regulate 
coastal property, due to the fear of the regulation being classified as a 
"taking." 
242. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
243. See discussion infra. 
244. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 46 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)). 
245. 438 U.S. at 149 n.l3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
246. 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
247. 482 u.s. 304 (1987). 
248. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
249. See text accompanying notes 361-362 infra. 
748 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Implicit in the concept of land use regulation is the premise that 
property rights are not absolute. Of all the so-called property rights, a 
right to develop one's property is the most likely source of conflict 
and, concomitantly, the right most likely to necessitate compromise. 
It is no longer reasonable to expect one's property rights to extend 
"from the center usque ad coelum. "250 A theory of taking jurispru-
dence that reinstates the right to . develop as fundamental or para-
mount fails to reflect the modem realities of land use regulation or the 
expectations of the property owner. Yet it is precisely this theory the 
Court embraced in a series of taking cases in the term. 251 
The 1987 harbinger of the new taking approach, although ostensi-
bly rejecting it, was Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedic-
tis.252 In Keystone, a coal association, whose members owned 
substantial coal reserves under legislatively protected property, chal-
lenged Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conser-
vation Act (Land Act) which prohibited coal mining that causes 
subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and 
cemeteries. 253 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that Pennsylvania law 
recognized a separate "support estate" in land and that the Land Act 
was a regulatory taking of that interest in violation of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments. 254 Because no injury to specific pieces of 
property was alleged, the only challenge to the Land Act was a facial 
challenge. 255 Yet the case squarely presented the difficulty of defining 
the unit of property allegedly "taken" by the regulation. 
In rejecting the taking claim, the district court had distinguished 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon on the grounds that the Land Act served 
valid public purposes not present in Pennsylvania Coal. 256 On the tak-
ing issue itself, the district court found no taking because the destruc-
tion of the support estate was a strand in a "bundle" of property 
rights, some of which were not affected by the Land Act. 257 The court 
of appeals affirmed, but with a different analysis. The court of appeals 
also found that the Land Act served legitimate purposes.258 However, 
the court did not rely on the support estate being a separate and dis-
tinct strand in a bundle of rights, but rather "considered the support 
estate as just one segment of a larger bundle of rights that invariably 
250. Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). 
251. See text accompanying notes 318-319, infra. 
252. 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
253. /d. at 476. 
254. /d. at 478. 
255. /d. at 493. 
256. /d. at 479. 
257. /d. 
258. /d. at 480. 
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includes either the surface estate or the mineral estate."2' 9 Thus, the 
district court evaluated the support estate as one strand in a bundle of 
property rights, and the Court of Appeals viewed it as inseparable 
from the surface estate or the mineral estate. In both lower courts, by 
following the Penn Central majority opinion, there was no taking by 
virtue of the definition of the property unit taken. If either court had 
accepted Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, the taking of one dis-
tinct property right, the support estate, would have been a regulatory 
taking. The Supreme Court, therefore, was squarely presented with a 
case in which the definition of the unit of property affected would be 
outcome determinative of whether there was a taking. 
Not surprisingly then, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion 
joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, with a 
dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Powell, 
O'Connor, and Scalia.260 Justice Stevens first had to address the simi-
larity of Keystone to Pennsylvania Coa/,261 in which Justice Holmes in 
a very similar case had found a taking. Citing the Pennsylvania legis-
lative determination that the Land Act was necessary to protect the 
public interest in "safety, land conservation, preservation of affected 
municipalities tax bases, and land development," the majority found 
that the "environmental concern" of the Land Act went far beyond 
the purpose of the Kohler Act which was enacted merely to protect 
individual private property.262 Acknowledging both the district 
court's and court of appeal's opinions, the Court stated that the por-
tion of Pennsylvania Coal addressed to the general validity of the 
Kohler Act was an "advisory opinion" not required by the issues in 
the case.263 Relying on Penn Central, the Court stated that land regu-
lation can effectuate a taking if it " 'does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land.' "264 As for the public purpose of the Land Act, the 
Court reiterated that the Land Act was to serve the public interest, not 
private interests, because, unlike the Kohler Act, the Land Act had no 
exception from its prohibition when the surface estate was owned by 
the owner of the support estate. 26' 
Although Justice Stevens suggested that the Land Act might fall 
within the nuisance exception for a taking under the police power, he 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 472. 
261. Id. at 481. 
262. Id. at 48S. 
263. Id. at 484. 
264. Id. at 48S. 
26S. Id. at 486. 
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went on to analyze whether the diminution in value was sufficient to 
constitute a taking. The Court seemed to carve out a potential excep-
tion to the taking clause for legislation to protect the public from a 
nuisance. Quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 266 in which a Kansas constitu-
tional amendment that prohibited the sale and manufacture of intoxi-
cating liquors was challenged, the Court stated, " 'prohibition simply 
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared by valid legis-
lation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the commu-
nity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of 
property ... .' " 267 Nevertheless, the Court declined to rest its decision 
on that factor alone and turned to the Land Act's diminution of prop-
erty value and investment-backed expectations. 
On the taking issue specifically, Pennsylvania law is unique in 
that it recognizes three separate estates in land: the mineral estate, the 
surface estate, and the support estate. 268 In Pennsylvania Coal, the 
Court had found that the Kohler Act had made mining of certain coal 
commercially impracticable. 269 Emphasizing that the case presently 
before it was afacial challenge to the Land Act, the Court emphasized 
that it was not presented with particular surface mining operations or 
their effect on specific parcels of land. 270 Noting that the plaintiff had 
not argued that' the Land Act itself made mining commercially im-
practical, the Court pointed out that instead the plaintiff had sought to 
define narrowly the unit of property allegedly taken by focusing on 
specific tons of coal and, alternatively, the separate support estate.271 
Quoting from Penn Central that effects on the parcel of property 
as a whole must be considered, 272 the Court rejected the plaintiff's 
arguments. The Court found that the 27 million tons of coal that 
could not be mined were not a "separate segment ofproperty."273 The 
Court emphasized that otherwise a simple set back requirement for a 
building on a lot could be characterized as a taking. 274 More trouble-
some, however, was whether the support estate recognized by Penn-
sylvania law was a property unit taken by the Land Act. The Court 
said that just as the air rights above Grand Central were a strand in a 
bundle of property rights, the support estate here considered was also 
266. 123 u.s. 623 (1887). 
267. 480 U.S. at 489. 
268. /d. at 500. 
269. /d. at 493. 
270. /d. at 496. 
271. /d. at 496. 
272. /d. at 497. 
273. /d. at 498. 
274. /d. 
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only one strand. 275 The court of appeals under Pennsylvania law had 
recognized as a practical matter that the support estate is always 
owned by either the surface estate owner or the mineral estate 
owner.276 Because the support estate could not be used without either 
the mineral estate or the surface estate, the Court held that the sup-
port estate was "merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed 
by the owner of either the coal or the surface. "277 
If the majority had stopped at that point, Keystone would have 
been a clear refutation of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central. 
The Court, however, qualified its definition of the property unit with 
an alternative holding. Even if the support estate were a distinct seg-
ment of property for taking purposes, the Court stated, there would 
still not be a taking. The record, according to Justice Stevens, was 
devoid of any evidence of what percentage of the support estates, 
either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, had 
. been affected by the Land Act. 278 
In an opinion echoing his disagreement in Penn Central, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist dissented, finding Pennsylvania Coal to be disposi-
tive.279 In the process, however, the dissent emphasized that a public 
purpose is necessary to the government's exercise of its police power, 
but does not itself have any bearing on whether a regulation goes so 
far as to be a taking. 280 Apparently contradicting his position in Penn 
Central, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected a broad nuisance exception 
to the taking clause, while accentuating that federal law, rather than 
state law, determines the legitimacy of the state's purpose. 281 In keep-
ing with his Penn Central dissent, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
rejected the majority's definition of the property unit. It was the 
smallest possible segment of property in the case, the 27 million tons 
of coal affected, that the dissent recognized as the property unit, a 
"property" that could not be removed under the Land Act and thus 
was destroyed. 282 The dissent stated that definition of the unit of 
property must be determined by state law.283 Quoting the same lan-
guage in Penn Central quoted above by the majority, the dissent again 
emphasized in a footnote that the Court in Penn Central gave no gui-
dance on how to define the property unit for purposes of taking 
275. ld. at SOO. 
276. ld. 
277. Jd. at 501. 
278. ld. 
279. /d. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
280. /d. at S 11 (Rehnquist, C.J ., dissenting). 
281. /d. at S 12 (Rehnquist, C.J ., dissenting). 
282. ld. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
283. /d. at S18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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jurisprudence. 284 
Although Keystone is ostensibly a victory of the majority decision 
in Penn Central, that victory is qualified by the alternative holdings of 
the majority opinion in Keystone, and by the fact that in his dissent, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist gained the support of Justices Powell, 
O'Connor, and Scalia as adherents to his views in place of former 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens. 28s 
It is far from clear how Justice Stevens defined the "property" 
allegedly taken by the Pennsylvania statute in Keystone. It is clear 
that he rejects the 27 million tons of coal as constituting a separate 
segment of property for purposes of the takings clause and in doing so 
rejects Pennsylvania property law as determinative of the issue. At 
one point Justice Stevens concludes that as a practical matter the sup-
port estate has value only in conjunction with the surface rights or the 
mineral rights so that the property unit in question is either the bundle 
of rights in the combined surface/support estates or combined min-
eral/support estates.286 More controversial, however, is Justice 
Steven's statement that, even if the support estate were a separate seg-
ment of property, the petitioners held support estates for "a great deal 
of land" and "[t]he record is devoid of any evidence on what percent-
age of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with 
respect to any individual estate" had been affected. 287 The perplexing 
aspect of this language is the suggestion that the extent of interference 
with property rights can be measured with respect to the petitioners' 
holdings of support estates in the aggregate. This approach seems to 
be a measurement of the economic impact of the regulation on the 
property owner rather than on the property itself. Does this approach 
mean that the greater the holdings of the disgruntled landowner the 
less likely it is to be a taking? Could Justice Brennan in Penn Central, 
for example, have measured the economic interference of the 
landmark restrictions not just against the "parcel as a whole" but 
against all of Penn Central's property in the immediate vicinity (or 
perhaps those properties to which the TDR's could have been 
transferred)? 
What also emerges from Keystone is that Rehnquist's approach to 
what constitutes a taking suffers from many of the definitional 
problems for which he criticized Justice Brennan's approach in Penn 
284. /d. at S 11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
28S. Compare Penn Central Transport. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rchn-
quist, J., dissenting) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, S07 (1987) 
(Rchnquist, C.J ., dissenting). 
286. 470 U.S. at SOl. 
287. /d. 
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Central and Justice Steven's approach in Keystone itself. Justice Rehn-
quist concluded with little explanation that the 27 million tons of coal 
are a separate property segment which had been taken. 288 Apparently 
the amount of coal is irrelevant so that one ton of coal would be a 
separate property segment. But what makes the coal a separate prop-
erty segment? Would a prohibition on use of one natural resource be a 
taking of a separate segment of property as well? For example, if a 
local ordinance prohibited drainage affecting certain wetlands, thereby 
precluding any use of water rights on a particular lot, would there be a 
taking even if other outside water sources were available and there was 
little or no economic impact on the value or use of the lot? Justice 
Rehnquist does at times equate the coal with the right to mine it, 
which is in turn equated with the support estate. Which of these is an 
identifiable segment of property the destruction of which would be a 
taking? Is any identifiable use of property a property right? Is the 
question determined solely by state law so that results would vary 
from state to state? If state law is not determinative, under Rehn-
quist's approach would there be a taking if the record demonstrated 
that the coal company's mining rights were extinguished but it re-
tained other valuable uses of the support state? Justice Rehnquist sim-
ply puts a great deal of emphasis on the recognition under 
Pennsylvania law of the support estate as a separate estate and sug-
gests no alternative framework to address beyond that context what is 
a separate segment of property for takings law purposes. 
What role, if any, state law will play in defining property rights 
will be necessarily a recurring issue before the Court. The issue sur-
faced squarely in a case during the 1990 term in which the Court 
avoided resolution of the taking issue altogether. In Preseau/t v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 289 the petitioners claimed a reversionary 
interest under state law in an unused railroad right-of-way. A 1983 
amendment to the National Trails System Act290 provided for conver-
sion of unused railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails subject to 
approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).291 The in-
terim recreational use under the statute cannot be treated for any pur-
pose as abandonment of the right-of-way, thus permitting the ICC to 
approve conversion from "rails to trails" without regard to reversion-
ary property interests under state law. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals had concluded that state property law was subject to the 
ICC's plenary authority to regulate so that no reversion could occur 
288. ld. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
289. Ito S. Ct. 914 (1990). 
290. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1241-1251 (1988). 
291. Id § 1247(d). 
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under state law until the ICC had issued a certificate of abandon-
ment. 292 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that the 
taking claim was premature until the petitioners had pursued their 
remedies under the Tucker Act, 293 expressing no opinion on this as-
pect of the ruling by the court of appeals. 294 
However, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy, concurred separately on the relevance of state law to the taking 
issue. To determine whether a taking has occurred, Justice O'Connor 
argued that the "basic axiom" is that" '[p]roperty interests ... are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.' "29' The concurring opinion 
concluded that the Preseaults' property rights should be determined 
by state law without reference to the ICC's authority or actions. 296 
Given the well established and plenary authority of the ICC in 
railroad regulation, the factual circumstances in Preseault presented a 
more compelling case for definition of property rights under federal 
law than would normally be the. case when a takings challenge is 
presented. Yet three justices of the Court concurred separately to rec-
ognize the paramount importance of state law in defining property 
rights for purposes of the takings clause. In light of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone, it would appear that at least four jus-
tices, and possibly five (given Justice Powell's participation in the Key-
stone dissent) would find state law to be dispositive in defining 
property rights. 
The leeway given the state in Penn Central was further eroded by 
the Supreme Court's next decision under the takings clause. In First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 297 the 
Supreme Court directly held, after years of avoiding the issue, that a 
damages remedy must be provided for regulatory "takings" under the 
fifth amendment as applicable to the states under the fourteenth 
amendment. In an earlier series of cases finding that there was clearly 
no taking or that the lower courts had not yet found a taking, 298 the 
292. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 883 F.2d 145, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 
S.Ct. 914 (1990). 
293. 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1988). 
294. ItO S.Ct. at 922. 
295. /d. at 926 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1001 (1984)). 
296. /d. at 926-928 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
297. 482 u.s. 304 (1987). 
298. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo City, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County 
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & E1ec. Co. v. San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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Supreme Court had refused to decide either the point at which a regu-
lation so interferes with property rights that there is a de facto taking 
of the property without just compensation or what the appropriate 
remedies for .such a taking might be. Lutheran Church was addressed 
to the second of these two issues, the appropriate remedy for a taking. 
Lutheran Church involved property located in a watershed area, 
on which the church had operated a retreat center and recreational 
area for handicapped children. 299 After a severe flood destroyed the 
buildings, Los Angeles county adopted an interim ordinance prohibit-
ing the construction or reconstruction of any structure in an interim 
flood protection area, which included the church's land. 300 In one of 
its claims, the. church sought the remedy of inverse condemnation for 
the regulatory taking of the church's property.301 In holding against 
the plaintiff church, both the trial court and the California Court of 
Appeals relied upon the distinction set out by the California Supreme 
Court in Agins v. Tiburon 302 between the appropriate remedy for a 
challenge to an ordinance that deprives a person of the total use of his 
lands, as opposed to the remedy for a physical taking. Because Agins 
ruled that the appropriate remedy for the former is declaratory relief 
or mandamus, the courts rejected the church's inverse condemnation 
cause of action. 303 
Although several of the justifications utilized in earlier cases to 
deny review were arguably presented in the Lutheran Church case, the 
Supreme Court nevertheless stated in its opinion that mandamus and 
declaratory relief are inadequate remedies for a regulatory interference 
substantial enough to constitute a taking under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, and that such a taking requires just compensation 
(that is, damages for the losses resulting from deprivation of property 
use from the time that the interference occurs until the legislating en-
tity either amends the offending regulation, withdraws the regulation, 
or pays compensation for a permanent deprivation of the property 
from the exercise of eminent domain). 304 
Because the Court had to accept as true the allegation in the com-
plaint that the Church had been denied all use of its property, the 
Court gave no further delineation of what degree of interference would 
299. 482 U.S. at 307. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on othe' grounds, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980). 
303. 482 U.S. at 308-309. 
304. Id. at 321-22. 
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amount to a taking. 305 In the opinion written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and 
Scalia, the Court emphasized that the takings clause "was not 
designed to limit governmental interference per se, but rather to secure 
compensation in the event of a taking. " 306 As to the frequently as-
serted argument that providing damages compels eminent domain in 
derogation of any of the government's other options, the Court 
pointed out that after having to provide interim damages for the tem-
porary taking, the government may still decide to amend the regula-
tion, withdraw the regulation, or exercise eminent domain. 307 The 
Court merely decided that " 'temporary' takings which . . . deny a 
landowner all use of his property are not different in kind from perma-
nent takings. . . . " 308 
To some extent, the dissent's statement that the decision will 
"generate a great deal of litigation"309 exaggerates the true significance 
of the opinion. The majority, following the dissent in San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. v. San Diego,310 merely restated the rule that a regulation 
can be a taking and that such regulatory takings are to be remedied by 
damages. 311 Thus, the holding of the Court did not in and of itself 
open the floodgates of litigation. What may do so, however, is the 
. dicta as to when a taking will occur. Because the lower courts had 
assumed that the floodplain statute denied the church all use of its 
property, the Court did not question that the deprivation was anything 
less. Yet the majority suggested that an interference which, if perma-
nent, would be a taking, constitutes a taking even if of a limited 
duration.312 
It is with this position that two of the dissenters, Justices Stevens 
and Blackmun, most strongly differ. 313 They would find compensa-
tion appropriate only when the effects of a regulation are so severe that 
"invalidation or repeal will not mitigate the 'taking' label." The dis-
senters, joined by Justice O'Conner, also argued that the majority ad-
dressed a takings issue not presented to the Court and improperly 
applied federal constitutional law when California constitutional law 
was determinative. 314 
305. Id. 
306. ld. at 315 (emphasis in original). 
307. Id. at 321. 
308. Id. at 318. 
309. ld. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
310. 450 U.S. 621, 654-55 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
311. 482 U.S. at 314-16. 
312. Id. at 318. 
313. I d. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
314. /d. at 322-28, 33S-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
1991] THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT 757 
The future delineation of what degree of regulatory interference 
constitutes a taking will determine whether the flood of litigation will 
be reduced to a trickle. Very few regulations deprive a landowner of 
all use of the regulated property. In fact, on remand the legislation in 
Lutheran Church was upheld.315 
Justice Brennan acknowledged for the majority in Penn Central 
that the Supreme Court had been unable to develop any "set formula" 
for determining when economic injury caused by governmental action 
requires compensation and that each case necessitates "ad hoc, factual 
inquiries."316 The Court had little difficulty in determining that the 
diminution in value of the property did not in itself constitute a taking 
within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, particu-
larly in light of Penn Central's concession that the property was still 
capable of earning a reasonable return. In determining the diminution 
in value borne by Penn Central, the Court refused to define the af-
fected property as "air rights;" it focused instead on the economic ef-
fects on the parcel as a whole, that is, the city tax block designated as 
the landmark site.317 
It is clear from Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent that he views 
deprivation of property, for purposes of the taking clause, as the depri-
vation of a property right or rights, and not as the deprivation of a 
degree of economic return on some undefined physical unit of real 
property.318 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 319 arguably for the first time 
extended this reasoning to the conclusion that deprivation of a single 
property right, the right to exclude others, may be a taking without 
regard to the economic value of any remaining unaffected rights in the 
property. 
315. On remand from the Supreme Court decision, the California Court of Appeals held that the 
floodplain ordinance was not a taking regardless of whether the appropriate test is that suggested in 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (requiring compensation ifa landowner is denied all uses 
of the property) or that of First English (not requiring compensation for deprivation of all uses so long 
as the deprivation promotes a substantial governmental interest). In attempting to reconcile the two 
tests the court concluded: 
It would not be remarkable at all to allow government to deny a private owner "all uses" of 
his property where there is no usc of that property which docs not threaten lives and health. 
So it makes perfect sense to deny compensation for the denial of "all uses" where health 
and safety are at stake but require compensation for the denial of all uses where the land 
usc regulation advances lesser public purposes. 
First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 893, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 
(1989). The church retained some use of the property because the ordinance only prohibited recon-
struction of structures damaged or demolished by floods and did not all'ect eight acres of the land-
owner's twenty-acre parcel. 
316. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
317. Id. at 131. 
318. ld. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
319. 467 u.s. 986 (1984). 
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If Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach in Penn Central is adopted 
in the future, it will be much easier to demonstrate a taking. Plaintiffs 
will need only to show deprivation of one cognizable property right 
(for example, the right to develop). Under Brennan's approach, as 
illustrated by the majority opinion in Penn Central, however, the eco-
nomic impact on the property as a whole will be evaluated to deter-
mine whether the regulatory interference goes so far as to be a taking 
without just compensation. If Chief Justice Rehnquist's view prevails, 
the ftoodgates will be opened because deprivation of a single cogniza-
ble property right may be viewed as a taking necessitating a remedy of 
damages. 
The crowning blow to traditional takings jurisprudence after 
Penn Central came with a decision involving coastal zone manage-
ment, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n.320 In Nollan, the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission granted a permit to replace a bungalow on a 
beachfront lot located between two public beaches, with the condition 
that the owners allow public easement across their beach. 321 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals had found that there was no taking because 
the condition did not deprive the landowner of all reasonable use of 
their property.322 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices White, fowell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Supreme Court equated the condition for the permit with a permanent 
physical occupation of the property and stated that "the 'right to ex-
clude [others] is 'one ofthe most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property:' " 323 The Court de-
clined to phrase the issue in terms of rights of access to navigable wa-
ters under California law. Instead the Court relied upon Monsanto 
and stated that the "right to build on one's own property" is not a 
"governmental benefit" easily erased by a governmental 
pronouncement. 32~ 
In stating the test for a taking, Justice Scalia used the same test 
Justice Stevens used in the majority opinion in Keystone: a regulation 
is not a taking if it " 'substantially advances legitimate state interests' 
and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his 
land.' " 32s The majority accepted as legitimate the public purposes 
stated by the California Commission for the conditional permit: "pro-
320. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
321. /d. at 827-29. 
322. /d. at 830. 
323. /d. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 
(1982)). 
324. /d. at 833-34 n.2. 
325. /d. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
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tecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting'the public in over-
coming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a 
developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public 
beaches."326 
If the Commission had denied the permit altogether, there would 
have been no taking regardless of which of the two measurements for a 
taking in Keystone was utilized. On the other hand, if the Commission 
had simply demanded that the Nollans provide lateral access to the 
beach, the requirement of physical access would have been a per se 
taking. The question then becomes whether conditioning the permit 
on a grant of lateral access amounted to a taking. To evaluate that 
question, Justice SCalia found it necessary to address the complex area 
of unconstitutional conditions-that a state cannot impose an uncon-
stitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege. He ac-
cepted, "for purposes of discussion," the Commission's proposed test 
that the condition must be reasonably related to the public need or 
burden created or exacerbated by the Nollan's proposed development, 
and concluded that the Commission's own test had not been met: 
It is quite impossible to understarid how ·a requirement that people 
already on the public beaches be able tow~ across the Nollans' 
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the 
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any 
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it 
helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by con-
struction of the Nollans' new house.327 
Justice Scalia emphasized that the proposed public access would run 
parallel to the coast and have no relationship to remedying reduced 
visual access from construction of the larger house. · 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joinep by Justice Mar-
shall, sharply criticized the majority's limitation of a state's discretion 
in exercising its police power, a limitation "discredited for the better 
part of this century."328 Even accepting the restrictive requirement 
that the regulation "substantially advance legitimate state interests," 
the dissent argued that the condition could still be upheld. 329 Finally, 
under the more traditional taking analysis, these dissenting Justices 
concluded no taking had occurred. 330 
In criticizing the Court's interpretation of the police power, Jus-
tice Brennan referred to a long line of cases requiring only that the 
326. /d. at 83S. 
327. /d. at 838·39. 
328. /d. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
329. /d. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
330. /d. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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exercise of the state police power have a rational basis.331 Ironically, 
Justice Brennan noted, if the Commission had denied the permit alto-
gether, there would have been no taking because the property would 
still have been economically viable. 332 As to the purported lack of a 
substantial link between the Commission's purposes and the condition, 
Brennan countered that the "proposed development would reduce 
public access by restricting visual access to the beach, by contributing 
to an increased need for community facilities, and by moving private 
development closer to beach property."333 While emphasizing the rea-
sonableness of the condition, Justice Brennan remarked: "The Com-
mission is charged by both the state constitution and legislature to 
preserve overall public access to the California coastline. Further-
more, by virtue of its participation in the Coastal Zone Management 
Act program, the State must 'exercise effectively [its] responsibilities in 
the coastal zone through the development and implementation of 
management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water re-
sources of the coastal zone,' 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2), so as to provide for, 
inter alia, 'public access to the coas[t] for recreation purposes.' "334 
Given the purposes of the CZMA, the dissenters took issue with the 
majority's conclusion that the Commission had only a "non-land use 
justification.''335 The purpose of the Commission, they said, was to 
preserve physical access as well as visual access. 336 According to the 
dissent, requiring an unduly restrictive purpose/means test rather than 
the traditional rational relation standard "could hamper innovative ef-
forts to preserve an increasingly fragile natural resource. " 337 Beyond 
the question of the state's interest, there could be no taking because 
the Nollans retained economically viable use of the land. 338 
Taking challenges to coastal regulation and to land use regulation 
in general stand a much better chance of success after Keystone, Lu-
theran Church, and Nollan. The Court seems well on its way toward 
recognizing complete deprivation of a right to develop property as a 
taking. Although this trend may be detrimental to innovative land use 
planning, it is certainly beneficial to the property owner challenging 
regulation. It is unclear. how far deprivation must go to be a taking, 
and the current trend is toward protection of individual property 
331. /d. at 843-48 n.l (Brennan,1., dissenting). 
332. /d. at 844-45 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
333. /d. at 845 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
334. /d. at 846-47 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
335. /d. at 848 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
336. /d. (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
337. /d. (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
338. /d. at 855-60 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
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rights at the expense of preservation and other rights in the public as a 
whole. In the coastal context, protection of public access, absent as-
sertions of public trust or a navigational servitude, seems less likely to 
withstand a taking challenge. Under Nollan, many such restrictions 
may be treated as physical interference with property rights and thus 
be extremely susceptible to invalidation under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. Moreover, it is now clear that such a constitutional vio-
lation must be remedied by damages for the period of the restriction. 
Restrictive regulation, such as restrictions to preserve open space, also 
seem more vulnerable to attack. For example, in Paoli v. California 
Coastal Commission, 339 the California Court of Appeals stated that a 
property owner had neither a vested right to develop property in a 
particular way nor a vested right to a coastal development permit. 
Accordingly, the CCC's issuance of a permit conditioned on open 
space preservation was upheld as rationally based. 340 After Nollan, a 
property owner such as the one in Paoli would have an alternative 
challenge as an unconstitutional taking. One remaining possible dis-
tinction between open space restrictions (and other similar restric-
tions) and access conditions is that open space requirements do not 
require physical interference, which is still the type of interference 
most susceptible to a taking challenge. 
It remains to be seen whether Nol/an may be subject to a nar-
rower interpretation. Commentators have suggested Nol/an estab-
lishes that a state may physically interfere with private property as a 
condition to granting a development permit only if the strict means/ 
purpose fit is demonstrated. 341 This interpretation is predicated on 
viewing Nollan as an exception or modification of the rule in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 342 that permanent physical oc-
cupation of property by the government is a taking per se. If the Com-
mission had simply required the Nollans to turn over an easement to 
the Commission there unquestionably would have been a taking. On 
the other hand, if the Commission had denied the permit outright, 
there would have been no taking. In that sense, Nollan represents an 
intermediate approach by which physical occupation as a permit con-
dition would be subject to stricter scrutiny than most regulatory tak-
ings, but to lesser scrutiny than that mandated by Loretto. This 
339. Paoli v. California Coastal Comm'n, 178 Cal. App. 3d 544, 223 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1986). 
340. /d. 
341. Compare Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor 
Obtuse, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1630 (1988) and Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1600 
(1988) with Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test ofNollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REv. 448 (1988). 
342. 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
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interpretation of Nollan also reconciles the case with established state 
land use exaction cases. In such cases, state courts have upheld exac-
tions for public amenities from developers in exchange for permits for 
increased development creating the need for such amenities. 343 
The criticism leveled by Justice Rehnquist at Justice Brennan's 
approach in Penn Central remains: if a taking is judged by the diminu-
tion in value of the property as a whole, what is the appropriate prop-
erty unit in any given case? 
Although the deluge of litigation direly predicted by Justice Ste-
vens in his First English dissent has not yet materialized, the Supreme 
court trilogy of cases is having an impact on takings cases in the lower 
courts. According to one commentator, from June of 1987 to October 
1, 1989, there were 111 state and federal cases reported in which land 
use regulation was challenged as a taking. 344 . Of these, only fourteen 
of the sixty-two cases de9ided on the merits held that there had been a 
taking-five federal cases and nine state cases. 34' Since First English, 
as of December 31, 1990, there have been seven cases awarding dam-
ages for a taking against the federal government. 346 
By any measurement these cases hardly represent a groundswell 
of litigation threatening to paralyze land use regulation. To under-
stand fully their significance, however, it is necessary to recall that 
343. Note, supra note 341, at 467-68. 
344. Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to the 
"Takings Issue," 15 CoLUM. J. ENvn.. L. 31, S9 (1990). 
34S. ld at 60. In one of the more significant state cases, Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74 
N.Y.2d 92, S42 N.E.2d 10S9, S44 N.Y.S.2d S42, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. SOO (1989), owners of a single-
room occupancy housing challenged the constitutionality of a municipal law that established a five-year 
moratorium on conversion, alteration, or demolition of single-room occupancy housing and obligated 
owners to restore all units to habitable condition and lease them at controlled rents for an indefinite 
period. The owners of the properties challenged the law as an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation. 
The court held that the loss of possessory interest that occurs when owners are forced to accept 
occupation of their properties by persons not already in residence results in deprivation of rights in 
those properties sufficient to constitute a per se physical taking. Id at 103, S42 N.E.2d at 1063, S44 
N.Y.S.2d at S46. Further, the court noted that the law was also a regulatory taking because the mora-
torium and anti-warehousing provisions denied the owners economically viable use of their properties. 
ld at 107, S42 N.E.2d at 106S-66, S44 N.Y.S.2d at S49. The nexus between the burden of the property 
owners and the alleviation of the social problem of homelessness was tenuous and failed the "means-
end" test. ld at 112, S42 N.E.2d at 1069, S44 N.Y.S.2d at SS2. The law's buy-out, replacement, and 
hardship exceptions did not mitigate the unconstitutional nature of the law. /d at 113-lS, S42 N.E.2d 
at 1069-70, S44 N.Y.S.2d at SS2-S4. 
346. The seven cases are Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 1S3 (1990); Florida 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Shelden v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 247 
(1990); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), 
aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Yancey v. United States, 91S F.2d 1S34 (Fed. Cir. 1990); United 
Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. 
United States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
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takings challenges were rarely successful as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law after Penn Central. Therefore, even limited success in 
these challenges, particularly against the federal government, is a sig-
nificant departure from the trend in prior litigation and enough to en-
gender caution on the part of land use planners when oontemplating 
regulatory options. It seems only reasonable to assume that these 
cases will continue to proliferate as the full repercussions of the 
Supreme Court trilogy become apparent in the lower courts. In the 
seven federal cases in which a taking has been found, the United States 
Claims Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have found it nec-
essary to address not only how far regulatory interference must go to 
be a taking, but also how to measure the damages once a taking has 
been found. 
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States,341 the Court of 
Claims, the primary forum for determination of taking claims under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act,348 ·ruled that a permit denial for 
limestone mining was a taking. 349 On appeal, 350 the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's holding that only 
current uses and not future ones could be considered in determining 
whether economically viable uses of the property remained, and thus 
the court remanded the case for evaluation of the remaining value of 
the property. 3S1 
On remand, the United States Claims Court ruled that the value 
of the property should be determined by examining a market of inves-
347. 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), vacated, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 
(1990). 
348. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). United States Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the 
Tucker Act over contractual claims against the United States exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 
(1988). The government has defended against taking claims in federal district court successfully by 
asserting that the district courts do not have jurisdiction. Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Case and 
the Problems, 8 HARV. ENvrL L. REv. I, 36 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Mt. Vernon Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 17 Env't Rep. Case (BNA) 2212, 2214 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (taking counterclaim); American 
Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 961 (E.D. Pa.) (injunctive relief sought), aff'd, 614 
F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1979); but see 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983) 
(district court jurisdiction over injunctive relief); and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 
(1979) (district court jurisdiction but government failed to contest jurisdiction). 
349. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 8 Cl. Ct. at 179. 
350. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
35 1. /d. at 905. One commentator has suggested that Florida Rock was a "strong candidate" for 
a taking determination: 
The plaintiff bought the property in 1972 for the specific purpose of mining limestone when 
there were no applicable federal statutes that required a permit. The Corps' jurisdiction 
was based on the need to temporarily deposit excavated material onto wetlands. The envi-
ronmental values were not substantial. Most importantly, the permit denial deprived plain-
tiff of the only current economically viable use of the property. 
Want, Federal Wetlands Litigation: 1986 to the Present, [Current Developments], 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
2563, 2569 (April 29, 1988). 
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tors speculating . on the property who were aware of the regulatory 
limits on the use of that property.3s2 The court therefore awarded 
damages for the full fair market value of the property. 
After concluding that the plaintiff's limestone mining on 98 acres 
of a 1,560 acre tract did not fall within the nuisance exception to the 
taking prohibition, the court's opinion focused on valuation of the 
property before and after the permit denial. Upon finding that no 
comparable sales were available, the court determined a value of 
$10,500 per acre based on adjustments to the property's acquisition 
cost to reflect "pre-permit-denial fair market value."3s3 As to post-
denial value the Claims Court asserted that it would be "patently un-
reasonable to require plaintiff to prove the total absence of any value, 
and more relevant ... , the absence of a market for the property."3S4 
As the finder of fact the court had to "discount proposed uses that 
[did] not meet a 'showing of reasonable probability that the land [was] 
both physically adaptable for such use and that there is a demand for 
such use in the reasonably near future.' " 3ss The court concluded that 
the proposed use of speculation was neither practicable nor reasonably 
probable, so that the post-denial value of the property was $500 per 
acre for "future recreational/water management" purposes rather 
than $4,000 per acre for investment purposes. 3s6 This 95% reduction 
in value and the fact that the plaintiff had purchased the property 
solely for the purpose of limestone mining was sufficient to demon-
strate to the court that there had been a permanent taking. 3s7 
Although the property had retained a residential value of $500 an 
acre, the court ordered payment of the full fair market value at the 
time of the taking, plus interest. 3s8 
In addition to the Florida Rock case discussed above, the Claims 
Court in a companion case ruled that the Corps' denial of another 
section 404 permit was a taking and awarded just compensation. In 
Love ladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 3s9 the Corps denied a permit 
to develop residential housing on 11.5 acres of wetlands in a 250 acre 
parcel, most of which had already been developed. On a summary 
judgment motion, the court refused to measure the economic impact 
352. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 169 (1990). 
353. /d. 
354. /d. at 170. 
355. /d. at 172 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d 
108, Ill (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981)). 
356. /d. 
357. /d. at 175-76. 
358. /d. at 176. 
359. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). 
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by the diminution in value of the entire 250 acres. 360 Following the 
same method of analy~is as in Florida Rock, the Claims Court in deter-
mining the property's pre-denial value found that the highest and best 
use was as a 40-lot residential development with a projected fair mar-
ket value of $2,658,000.361 The court held that there was no economi-
cally viable use of the property without a permit, even though the 
post-denial value for the property of $1,000 per acre was based on the 
remaining conservation and recreational uses of the property. 362 The 
United States asserted that the property could be adapted for use for 
hunting, agriculture, a mitigation site, or a marina. The court found 
these contentions "unsupported" and without any evidence establish-
ing a market for such uses. 363 Similarly, the court found no evidence 
to demonstrate a market for the one acre of uplands the government 
claimed could be developed and sold for up to $40,000.364 The 99% 
diminution in value, coupled with the court's earlier determination of 
no countervailing substantial state interest, led the court to find a tak-
ing. 365 As in Florida Rock, the court ordered payment of the prop-
erty's full market value at the time of the taking plus interest despite 
its residual value of $12,500 after the taking.366 
Both courts emphasized in their opinions that no economically 
viable use of the property in question remained after regulation, often 
despite apparent conservation, agricultural, and recreational uses for 
the property. The courts also appear to be utilizing the "before and 
after" fair market value of the highest and best use of the property to 
determine damages, an approach that results in higher damages than 
many alternative formulations such as measuring damages to immedi-
ate use values. Although admittedly a very small sampling, these 
cases suggest that landowners may well be succeeding with takings 
challenges by showing that no development use remains in the prop-
erty and then may recover for damage done to the potential develop-
mental value rather than to the immediate use value of the property. 
The Supreme Court decisions under the taking clause, if nothing else, 
have created sufficient ambiguity in the area to encourage taking 
claims when uses of property are substantially restricted. 
360. /d. at I 54. 
361. Id. at 157. 
362. /d. at 158. 
363. Jd. at 158-59. 
364. Jd at 159. 
365. Jd. at 160. 
366. Jd. at 161. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIARY 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION AS LAND USE 
REGULATORS 
What might otherwise appear to be. an unjustifiable failure by 
Congress to give teeth to the CZMA can only be understood in the 
historical context of the environmental movement and federal involve-
ment in land use control in the United States. As a field, environmen-
tal law has just reached its twentieth year. The modern era of 
environmental law is generally traced to the passage of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969.367 NEPA was followed 
by a succession of landmark environmental statutes in the 1970's regu-
lating air pollution, water pollution, solid and hazardous waste, en-
dangered species, and drinking water, among other environmental 
concerns. Environmental destruction was addressed in this period by 
legislation specifically directed to the environment, which either set up 
a process for environmental evaluation, as in NEPA, or imposed con-
trols on pollution sources, as in the Clear Air and Clean Water Acts. 
In this heyday of environmental preservation, there was inestimable 
faith in the command-and-control regulatory approach to environ-
mental problems. In part this approach was predicated on a naive 
assessment of environmental processes. If there was too much carbon 
monoxide or sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere, Congress's response 
was to require compliance with a technology-based standard for the 
offensive pollutant or to create a health-based ambient quality stan-
dard with the intricacies of implementation left to the overburdened 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
The roots of the command-and-control approach to environmen-
tal regulation, however, went much deeper. Throughout ~he 1970's, 
Congress repeatedly confronted and rejected any measures that even 
approximated what could be considered federal land use controls. 
From 1970 to 1975, approximately forty national land use bills that 
would have established planning procedures for states supported by 
federal funding were rejected by one or both houses of Congress, 368 
even though the proposals would have left the actual planning process 
to the states. The entrenched political resistance to "federal zoning" 
ignored the fact that the federal government had been involved in land 
use regulation since the 1700's. 369 Even while efforts for a national 
367. 42 u.s.c. § 4321-4370b (1988). 
368. See, e.g., Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use 
Control, 24 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST 1. 33 (1989). 
369. R. HYMAN, NATIONAL LAND USE POLICY LEGISLATION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1979); see 
generally Johnson, Land Use Planning and Control by the Federal Government, in No LAND Is AN 
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land use policy were failing in Congress, federal legislation was creat-
ing what Donald Hagman referred to as the "quiet federalization of 
land use controls.'mo To avoid the appearance of federal zoning, even 
the most expansive federal programs affecting land use (like the 
CZMA in 1972 and the CBRA in 1982) were limited to funding of 
state or local programs for land use regulation in accordance with fed-
eral standards371 or withdrawal of federal funding for environmentally 
destructive activities. 
By the late 1970s, a well-worn pattern for environmental regula-
tion had been set. If an environmental problem could be addressed 
through imposition of technological standards, Congress would man-
date that approach. For environmental problems that seemingly had 
to be addressed through land use controls, such as preservation of 
floodplains and coastal zones, federal standards would set criteria for 
voluntary state and local land use programs, with the incentive of fed-
eral funding for qualifying programs. 372 
A new era of environmental regulation was ushered in with the 
1980s. Ten years of technology-based standards had failed to produce 
clean air and clean water or to rectify other environmental problems 
such as contamination of groundwater with toxic waste. Economists 
criticized the command-and-control approach to environmental pres-
ervation and succeeded in their call for increased use of cost/benefit 
analysis and economic incentives in environmental decisionmaking. 
The Reagan administration emphasized an expanded role for state and 
local governments while decreasing federal funding for state and local 
environmental programs. 373 
IsLAND 75 (1975); N. LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND UsE LEGISLA-
TION 1970-75 (1976); C. LAMB, LAND USE PoLmCS AND LAW IN THE 1970's 36-54 (1975). 
370. A. Rl!rrzE, ENviRONMENTAL PI.Aro!NING: LAW OF LAND AND REsoURCES 1-10 (1974). 
371. Hagman, A New Deal: TrtJding Windfalls for Wipeouts, in No LAND Is AN ISLAND 169, 173 
(1975). 
372. The different ways in which federal programs affect or dictate land use have been character-
ized as follows: 
I. They directly regulate the use that may be made of land; 
2. They fund state or local programs of land use 'regulations; 
3. They require the preparation of plans to guide future land uses; 
4. They construct, or pay for the construction of, facilities that use land and that may strongly 
inftuence surrounding land uses; and 
S. They provide a variety of stimulants and depressants to various segments of the economy that 
inftuence the way private users of land behave. 
F. BossELMAN, D. FEURER & T. RICHTER, fEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION 1-2 (1977). 
373. "States will be encouraged to assume more responsibility for administering federal environ-
mental laws through a combination of increased leeway to .conduct environmental programs and offers 
of grant assistance, according to a policy statement signcid by Environmental Protection Agency Ad-
ministrator William D. Ruckelshaus April 4." EPA Policy Encourages Greater State Role, Funding 
Viewed as Key By Bipartisan Caucus, (Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 14 (Apr. 6, 1984). 
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The modem era of state and local government involvement in 
land use can be traced to the issuance in 1922 by the United States 
Department of Commerce of the Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act374 as a model for state delegation of zoning powers and the 1926 
decision of the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 375 upholding the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning. 
These two events would lead to virtually exclusive control of land use 
by local governments for nearly fifty years. The counter-revolution in 
land use was first recognized in 1971 in a seminal book entitled "The 
Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control."376 In that book, the authors 
illuminated a growing trend in which state legislatures were reallocat-
ing land use authority from local governments to regional and state-
wide entities. This trend was reflected in the American Law 
Institute's Model Land Development Code.377 Adopted in 1975, the 
Code was the result of a twelve-year study of the Standard Zoning 
Enabling Act, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, and state leg-
islation based upon the acts. Article seven of the Model Code pro-
vides for an expanded state role in land use regulation through state 
review of local decisionmaking in critical areas and for major develop-
ments. Although the United States Senate would pass the Land Use 
Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973, 37·8 based roughly on arti- " 
cle seven of the Code, 379 the legislation did not pass in the House of 
Representatives. The Act would have provided federal funding to 
states regulating areas of critical state concern, developments of re-
gional benefit, large-scale development, and areas impacted by key fa-
cilities such as major airports and highway interchanges. 
Undeniably the dissatisfaction with local regulation was in part 
due to social problems created by fragmented, uncoordinated growth 
controls. Yet it is questionable whether this quiet revolution would 
have taken place without the environmental awareness of the late 
1960s and 1970s. The growing sophistication in the science of ecology 
in this period directly led to an understanding of the need for regional 
and state controls to protect an entire ecosystem. The shift in the con-
cept of property-as-commodity to property-as-resource necessitated a 
fundamental rethinking of the ultimate goals of all land use regulation. 
374. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, ADVISORY COMMI1TI!E ON ZoNING, A STANDARD 
STATE ZoNING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926). . 
31S. 272 U.S. 36S (1926). 
376. F. 8ossELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CoNTROL (1971). 
377. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTI! (Proposed Official Draft 
1975). 
378. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
379. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTI! (Proposed Official Draft 
1975). 
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To their credit, states as well as local governments began to experi-
ment with innovative land use techniques. A number of states 
adopted legislation based on article seven of the Model Code to protect 
critical areas and regulate developments of regional impact or bene-
fit. 380 State and regional regulation in most states did not usurp local 
zoning powers so much as create an additional layer of regulation or 
oversight for local decisionmaking in accordance with the Model Code 
approach. Within such a framework, local governments increasingly 
utilized methods such as planned unit developments, open space zon-
ing, and transferable development rights to preserve natural resources 
and protect environmental values. 
State and local governments in the late 1980's have also taken the 
initiative in environmental regulation that was thought to be the exclu-
sive province of the federal government in the 1970's. With respect to 
pollution controls, states have taken advantage of provisions in the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act that allow states to impose 
stricter controls than the federal acts require. 381 Freed from the re-
straints of preemption, the states have responded with such stringent 
controls that industries confronted with varying state standards are 
lobbying for federal preemption. 382 Local governments have aggres-
sively become involved in regulation to equalize the burdens from en-
vironmental risks, for example, enacting right-to-know ordinances 
requiring disclosure of risks from hazardous waste and land use ordi-
nances to regulate (or prohibit) hazardous waste facilities contaminat-
ing groundwater within their jurisdiction. Despite fears of local 
protectionism, local environmental regulation has proliferated383 to fill 
in the gaps of federal environmental regulation, most notably through 
the mechanism of land use regulation so ardently avoided at the fed-
eral level. Nowhere is this new state environmentalism better repre-
sented than in coastal zone management, although state efforts have 
been hampered by inadequate funding. In addition to the problem of 
inadequate funding, state-imposed land use controls increasingly have 
fallen victim to the spectre of the takings clause which has loomed 
large over land use regulation since a shift in takings jurisprudence in 
the late 1980's. 
Ironically, the so-called quiet revolutions in allocation of land use 
380. See generally, Bosselman, Raymond & Persico, Some Observations on the American Law 
Institutes Model Land Development Code, in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE 
SEVENTIES 103-04 (1981). 
381. See generally THE LAND UsE AWAKENING, note 380, supra. 
382. For a few examples of such state laws, see Begley, E Pluribus, Plures, Newsweek, Nov. 13, 
1989 at 70-72. 
383. /d. at 72. 
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authority and environmental regulation coincided with a not-so-quiet 
revolution in takings jurisprudence from the Supreme Court. The tril-
ogy of cases in the 1987 term384 created even greater uncertainty as to 
what constitutes a taking than had been the case in the 1970s. If any-
thing clearly emerged from these opinions, it was that a new coalition 
was forming on the Court which appeared more predisposed to find a 
taking by restrictive land use regulation. The coalition had not coa-
lesced, however, to the point of agreement on what degree of economic 
deprivation constitutes a taking. Yet, while state and local govern-
ments were moving away from the concept of property-as-commodity 
to property-as-resource, a tenuous majority of the Court seemed in-
clined to evaluate land use regulation solely for its interference with 
the developmental value of property. 
Not surprisingly under these circumstances, the "psychological" 
impact of the Court's decisions has far exceeded their scope as a mat-
ter of law.38' Any intrusive, non-traditional land use regulation is 
likely to be confronted with threats of litigation from landowners. It is 
surprising under these circumstances that state and local governments 
have continued to experiment with land use techniques and to pursue 
environmental preservation of the coasts with the vigor that they have 
demonstrated in recent years. Yet the impact of the Supreme Court 
trilogy is undeniable. In short, state governments are stuck between a 
rock and a hard place when it comes to any environmental regulation 
of land use. On the one hand, they confront the public pressures for a 
better environment, expanding federal requirements for environmental 
programs, and the need for experimentation with regional, statewide, 
and interstate land use controls. On the other hand, they are con-
fronted with decreased federal funding, resistance from private land-
owners to growth restrictions, and the inestimable risk of monetary 
damages for a regulatory taking. The outcome of this conflict in 
coastal zone management and in the more general context of environ-
mental management will depend on two essential variables-further 
refinement by the Supreme Court of the takings clause and the priority 
to be given federal funding of state and local environmental programs 
in Congress. · 
At this juncture, there is no indication that the need for environ-
mental regulation through land use will somehow diminish, particu-
larly for the coasts. Since the Stratton Commission report in 1969, the 
384. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
385. See generally Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in Environmental 
Regulation, S UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 14S (1986). 
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energy crisis has occurred, the environmental movement has arisen 
and proliferated, and centuries of the law of the sea has undergone 
dramatic changes. If anything, renewed commitment to the CZMA is 
more important to strike a balance between development and preser-
vation in the coastal zone than it was when the Act was passed. It is 
unrealistic to assume that states alone, in the guise of "states' rights," 
should bear the financial responsibility for management of coastal ar-
eas of national significance. 
There is no question that the 1990 amendments to the CZMA 
were intended by Congress to give new strength to the Act, 386 but in 
the all too familiar ways. The two incentives for state programs-
federal funding and consistency review for federal activities-were in-
creased and broadened respectively. The Coastal Energy Impact 
Fund, never adequately funded to serve its purposes, was abandoned 
for the much more limited Coastal Zone Management Fund which 
covers any special, designated costs of administration that states may 
incur with a program. Rather than redefine with more precision the 
substantive land use requirements for state programs to address the 
most pressing problems of coastal protection, Congress created two 
new grant programs for nonpoint source pollution and for eight identi-
fied areas needing "enhancements" in state programs. 
In creating these two programs, Congress did take one small step 
away from vague policy directives toward more substantive federal 
regulation. After two years of extensive federal involvement in land 
use, it is time the taboo on federal land use was acknowledged as a 
myth not worth preserving. Substantive federal standards for designa-
tion of coastal zones and acceptable land uses within them do limit 
state and local land use authority, but do not by any means completely 
usurp their authority. Given the states' expanding role as guardians of 
the environment, political resistance to such an innovation may be 
overestimated in any event. 
From a public policy perspective, land use decisionmaking with a 
local or regional impact should remain the prerogative of state and 
local governments. Zoning decisions between competing commercial 
and residential uses, for example, are best resolved in a forum in which 
the parties concerned and affected by . the decision may make their 
views known and, ultimately, express their approval or disapproval of 
official action in the electoral process. On the other hand, it is un-
386. The House conference report on the amendments states that the section on the findings and 
purposes of the amendments were meant to emphasize "the ever increasing pressures on coastal zone 
resources and the need to improve state management programs to meet those challenges." H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 964, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 969, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2374, 
2674. 
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thinkable that preservation of environmental quality would be left to 
state and local governments. The American public in recent years has 
been made well aware of the necessity for environmental regulation at 
the federal level and has come to accept its pervasiveness as the only 
way in which environmental values may be preserved. The problem 
simply put is that there is no talismanic distinction between environ-
mental and land use regulation with respect to preservation of critical 
environmental resources such as wetlands, coastal zones, and flood-
plains. Once this artificial distinction between the two types of regula-
tion is recognized, we are free to examine whether in a given case the 
original justifications for reserving land use to state and local govern-
ments hold true. 
It is unrealistic to expect that coastal zones will be protected ade-
quately as an interrelated ecosystem without substantive, minimum 
federal standards any more than suitable air quality could ever have 
been achieved or maintained by the federally funded state programs 
prior to passage of the Clear Air Act in 1970. When preservation of a 
critical environmental ecosystem is at stake, there is a need for federal 
intervention that transcends state and local prerogatives, because the 
parties affected by the decisionmaking (and thus the forum in which 
those decisions should be made) are no longer limited to those persons 
living in the immediate vicinity of the resource. In that sense, control-
ling development that will impair the environmental values of coastal 
resources is better characterized as "environmental regulation" to be 
addressed at the federal level than "land use" regulation reserved to 
state and local governments. The consistency review process could 
benefit from federally imposed exclusions of particularly fragile coastal 
areas, such as wildlife refuges and habitats for endangered species, 
from the leasing process, a limited reform that Congress has imposed 
already on a case-by-case basis. In all other cases, the mediation au-
thority of the Secretary should be clearly delineated as to when and 
how conflicts between environmental values and energy needs should 
be resolved. Admittedly, such standards are difficult to formulate, but 
the present system leaves the states and federal agencies to make these 
determinations without the benefit of Congress' evaluation of national 
priorities. 
The Supreme Court's taking jurisprudence, of course, is not sus-
ceptible to such reforms. When the Court does formulate a test for the 
degree of economic interference necessary for a taking, hopefully its 
judgment will be informed by the modem notion of property-as-re-
source. The Court's most recent taking decisions do nothing to foster 
that hope, however, nor do many of its other environmental decisions. 
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For example, the Supreme Court decisions under the CZMA are con-
sistent with the Court's approach under NEP A, which delays consid-
eration of environmental factors in a way that precludes meaningful 
evaluation of projects that impact on the environment. Congress can 
intervene, however, to overrule the Court's interpretation of the 
CZMA as it did with Secretary of the Interior v. California. 
Renewed commitment to the CZMA is particularly crucial in the 
near future. The newly claimed exclusive economic zone extending 
200 miles seaward from the coast will require planning and balanced 
development, which cannot be done without cooperation between state 
and federal governments. 387 Management of the coastal zone necessi-
tates federal cooperation in addressing issues such as ocean incinera-
tion and dumping, ocean mining, and extended fishing rights. Coastal 
protection is on the verge of slipping into a sea of budget cuts and 
political battles over state and federal power that ignore the deficien-
cies of the Act itself. Without a renewed commitment to coastal regu-
lation, what progress has been made in the delicate balance of state 
and federal cooperation and coastal development and preservation will 
be irreparably destroyed. 
387. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a federal study 
of the northern Great Plains region for resource development was not yet a "proposal" for federal 
action triggering the requirement of an environmental impact statement, although the study clearly was 
prepared in preparation for development of the area. 
